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For over the soul 
 God can and will let no one rule but Himself.  
Therefore, where temporal power presumes to proscribe laws for the soul, 
 it encroaches upon God’s government and only 
 misleads and destroys souls. 
 
~ 
 
هک داد دهاونخ هزاجا و دناوت ینم دنوادخ 
 یرغ هب سک چیه .دشبا هت شاد طلست ناسنا حور رب شدوخ زا  
 کی لهئ سم نیا ،دنک ررقم ار نیاحور ینناوق دنک یعس یویند تردق هک ییاج ره هجیتن رد  
  ییهلا تموکح هب زواتجدشبا یم یهارمگ بجوم طقف هک  
 دوش یم حور نیاریو و.  
 
~ 
 
Martin Luther 
1523 AD 
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Glossary of Essential Terms in Persian 
 
Ayatollah:  
Means ‘the Sign of God’ and is an honorary title within Shi’a Islam. It is usually assigned to legal 
scholars who are fully qualified mujtahids and who serve as a local marja’-e taqlid. The title 
became increasingly common in post-revolutionary Iran.  
 
Hujatolislām:  
Means ‘Proof of Islam’ and is a title given to middle ranking Shi’ite clerics who achieve the rank 
of mujtahid but are net yet considered Ayatollahs. 
 
Ijtihād:  
An Islamic legal term meaning ‘independent reasoning.’ There are three different positions on 
ijtihad in contemporary Shi’ite thought. The first is the relatively rare akhbārī tradition, which 
rejects ijtihad, suggesting that the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet are sufficient sources for 
Islamic law and social practice. The role for the clerical establishment (‘ulema) in this tradition is 
minimal, acting simply as the readers of Islamic texts. The second position is the modern version 
of the us̥ūlī tradition in Iran, called narrative-centered (naql meh̥var) ijtihad. This states that the 
Qur’an and Sunna require interpretation through human reason, though that human reason is to be 
held as ‘secondary’ to the infallible texts of Islam. This narrative-centered ijtihad requires a 
significant role for the ‘ulema as the qualified interpreters of Islam or mujtahids. It also enshrines 
the role of a marja’-e taqlid, or human source of emulation, that Shi’ites must emulate and trust 
for Islamic guidance (taqlīd). The third is a modern derivation of the us̥ūlī tradition called reason-
centered (‘aql meh̥var) ijtihad. This states that the Qur’an, Sunna, and Islamic jurisprudence are 
not sufficient guides for the establishment of a system of governance, for example, and therefore 
require other sources of non-religious human knowledge to be focused on and reasoned with 
through a lens of Islamic virtue. Reason-centered ijtihad is also used to take the judgments of 
mujtahids as the focus on them through a further level of ijtihad to be exercised by individuals and 
groups of believers in a continuous fashion. See Kamrava, Mehran. Iran's Intellectual Revolution. 
pg. 148-9 and ‘Edalatnezhad, Saeed. “Kudam Ijtihad?” (Which Ijtihad?) in Andarbab-e Ijtihad: 
Darbar-ye Kar-amadiye Fiqh-e Islami Dar Donya-ye Imruz.(On Ijtihad: About the Efficacy of 
Islamic Jurisprudence in Today’s World) pg. 8. for greater details. 
 
Majlis: 
The Iranian majlis refers specifically to its parliamentary institutions. 
 
 - v - 
Marja’-e Taqlid: 
Means ‘Source of Emulation’ or ‘Authority to be Followed.’ It is a position held by the highest 
ranking members of the Shi’ite clerical communities. The title is bestowed upon four to eight high-
ranking Ayatollahs on a local or national level and is only applied to one or two individuals on an 
international scale. Ayatollah Khomeini was the international marja’-e taqlid in the 1970s and 80s. 
 
Mujtahid: 
Means ‘one who is capable of practicing ijtihad.’ To qualify to be a mujtahid, one must be formally 
trained in Islamic law and have an extensive knowledge of the Qur’an and Hadith. In Shi’a Islam, 
only clerics can be mujtahids, though reformers like ‘Abdolkarim Soroush believe that the 
interpretations of mujtahids require an extra level of ijtihad among believers as well. 
 
Rahbar:  
Means ‘Leader’ in Persian. This is the term used specifically for the head of the Islamic Republic, 
sometimes referred to as the ‘Supreme Leader.’ This position is currently held by Ayatollah 
Khamene’i.  
 
Taqlīd: 
Means ‘imitation’ and is used to refer to a notion of Muslims conforming to the judgments of past 
doctrine, traditions, and interpretations. Taqlid frequently takes on a meaning of ‘blind’ imitation 
among some reformers, though in Shi’a Islam, it is considered to be more of a trust or a confidence 
in the judgments of mujthaids than a blind imitation. 
 
‘Ulemā: 
Is used to refer to the clerical establishment in Shi’a Islam.  
 
Velāyat-e Faqīh:  
Means ‘Guardianship of the Jurist’ or ‘Custodianship of the Jurist.’ This was Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s plan for religious governance whereby the Islamic Jurists, who he believed were the 
most qualified leaders, would oversee the community of believers in the absence of the infallible 
Shi’ite Imams.  
 
*Many of these definitions have been paraphrased from The Oxford Dictionary of Islam by John Esposito* 
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A Note on the Transliteration 
 
The transliteration for the Persian words used throughout are my own. They are, however, based 
on a guide for transliterating Arabic and Persian words from the International Journal of Middle 
East Studies (IJMES).  It should be noted that although the majority of the transliterated words are 
borrowed from Arabic, their spellings and pronunciations are provided as they appear in Persian. 
The diacritics are given both in the glossary and the first time the word is mentioned in the text.  
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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the Iranian Reform Movement’s ‘Islamization of secularism’ between 1990 
and 2004 as a case study on the changing relationship between secularism, Islam, and democracy in the 
contemporary Middle East. It focuses on the intellectual efforts of Iranian reflexive revivalists, ‘Abdolkarim 
Soroush, Mohammad Shabestari, Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, Akbar Ganji, and Abbas Milani, by framing 
their theories historically, theoretically, and through their practical applications. The historical framework 
from 1953 – 2014 is divided into two overarching eras of thought: the post-colonial theoretical era from 
1953 – 1989 and the post-authoritarian theoretical era from 1990 – 2014. By isolating these two distinct 
eras of political thought, a stark discursive shift is highlighted away from objectivist and totalizing visions 
of ideological secularism and Islam during the post-colonial theoretical era, and towards deobjectified 
interpretations of both theories that were infused with democratic ideals during the post-authoritarian era. 
During this time, Iranian intellectuals established a single democratic theory that combined both secular 
and Islamic thought whereby the politicization of Islam fundamentally relied on a secular and democratic 
system of governance to allow for the continuous evolution of religious knowledge and critical thought. 
The advocates of this theory, however, have been brutally repressed by the conservative clerical 
establishment for the last two decades and have been prevented from enacting significant democratic reform 
within the Islamic Republic.  
Despite this repression, the hope for democratic change and the implementation of this new 
intellectual discourse is still very much alive both within Iranian civil society and abroad within many trans-
national Shi’ite political organizations. As such, Iran’s revolutionary reinterpretation of secular, Islamic, 
and democratic theories is both relevant and applicable as a reference for present Middle Eastern 
democratization efforts as they navigate their own unique balance between secularism, Islam, and 
democracy. This reference is best understood through four points. First, objectivist and absolutist ideologies 
of the post-colonial era are unsustainable bases for democratic politics. Second, Islam is best understood in 
terms of an ever-changing discursive tradition that lends a moral and spiritual component to everyday 
political, social, and economic interactions. Third, Secularism should be understood as the creation of a 
non-coercive overlapping political consensus and the ideological neutrality of the government that allows 
for political agency to rest in the hands of the governed. Finally, because there is no outline for a form of 
governance in the Qur’an or the Sunna of the Prophet, traditional modes of Islamic interpretation are not 
sufficient for the creation of a democratic state. As such, a unique form of reason-based ijtihad is necessary 
that focuses on both religious and non-religious human knowledge as a means of socially constructing and 
changing political paradigms over time. 
 
Keywords: Islamization of Secularism, Iranian Reform Movement, Middle East Democratization 
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The Implications of the Iranian Reform Movement’s Islamization 
of Secularism for a Post-Authoritarian Middle East 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: The Emergence of a Secular and Islamic Democratic Discourse in Iran 
 
The Iranian people today live under an oppressive authoritarian regime that imposes a 
narrow interpretation of Islamic governance across the country. They have been fighting for 
democratic and religious reform for decades, however, but their battle is not with an ordinary 
authoritarian government. Iranian reformists are not simply colliding with repressive government 
institutions, but with the very epicenter of politicized Shi’ite clerical authority and the 
fundamental identity of Shi’a Islam itself. According to Nader Hashemi, an Iranian-American 
professor and author specializing in Islamic affairs, democracy, and Iranian politics, a reformist 
narrative of Shi’a Islam that is infused with both secular and democratic theories has won out in 
the hearts and minds of nearly 80 percent of Iran’s voting population. This popular reformist 
discourse, which Hashemi has described as, “Islamic secularism,”1 illustrates a stark disconnect 
between the repressive clerical regime and the Iranian people. This ‘Islamic secularism’ should 
not be understood in terms of an accommodation of Islam by secularism or democracy, however, 
as that would suggest that democratization and secularization are both normative projects based 
                                                          
1 Hashemi, Nader. “Is Rouhani the Iranian Gorbachev?” 
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on a specific, ostensibly Western, vision of modernity. Rather, this is a phenomenon whereby 
religious intellectuals and everyday Iranians alike have reconceptualized secular political theory 
based on their own unique social, historical, and religious experiences. Through this process, 
they have produced a revolutionary vision of what secular democratic governance could look 
like through a lens of Islamic virtue.   
The notion that a democratic state could be both secular and Islamic would seem 
counterintuitive at first glance, but that is exactly what a new wave of Iranian intellectuals have 
been working towards since the early 1990s. For this Islamization of secularism to be properly 
understood, however, a great deal of theoretical reconceptualization is necessary to see beyond 
preconceived notions of these political theories in fundamental opposition to one another. The 
most intuitive way to understand such a radical redefinition of secular and Islamic theory is by 
framing it in three ways—historically, theoretically, and through its concrete applicability in 
recent history.  
Historically speaking, political Islam and secularism in Iran have had a relationship of 
prolonged interlocution and theoretical overlap.2  They have been defined and redefined based on 
a shared intellectual and historical heritage that has been shaped by the events leading up to the 
1978-79 Islamic Revolution, the revolution itself, and its violent aftermath throughout the 1980s. 
This post-colonial theoretical period from 1953 – 1989 was dominated by Cold War era 
ideological trends of universality and vaguely defined, supposedly monolithic, notions of Islam 
and secularism. By contrast, beginning in 1989, evolving divisions within Iran’s political elite 
and popular disillusionment with the ideological promises of the post-colonial era gave way to a 
reconceptualization of Islamic and secular theory in a deobjectified and democratic light, 
                                                          
2 Mahmood, Saba. Politics of Piety :The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. pg. 24-5. 
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signaling the beginning of a post-authoritarian theoretical era. It was in 1997, at the height of this 
post-authoritarian era, that the Iranian reform movement arose, undergirded by the epistemic 
revolution that was the ‘Islamization of secularism.’ 
To further conceptualize the complexities of the Islamization of secularism it is useful to 
also introduce a theoretical framework, beginning with a categorization of the intellectuals 
themselves. The leaders of this epistemic revolution were a diverse group of Iranian professors, 
clerics, secular-modernists, and other political reformists both inside and outside the state, who 
have been collectively described as ‘reflexive revivalists.’3 They were ‘reflexive’ in that they 
critically looked inwards at Iran’s social, intellectual, religious, and historical traditions, and 
longer blamed the outside world for their domestic imperfections or political problems. They 
were ‘revivalists’ in the sense that they did not try to fundamentally rework Islamic truth, but 
rather, sought to critique human knowledge of Islam, secularism, and democracy to revive their 
Islamic Revolution in a democratic fashion.4  
Talal Asad, a Saudi Arabian anthropologist and political theorist, presents two concepts 
from his anthropological deconstruction of Islam and secularism that provide a valuable 
overarching theoretical framework. First, he suggests that Islam should be understood as a 
discursive tradition that, “is simply a tradition of Muslim discourse that addresses itself to 
conceptions of the Islamic past and future with reference to a particular Islamic practice in the 
present.”5 This means that contemporary Islamic political theory, for example, is derived from a 
past compilation of human interpretations of Islamic texts, traditions, and jurisprudence that 
                                                          
3 Soroush, ʻAbdolkarim, Mahmoud Sadri, and Ahmad Sadri. Reason, Freedom, & Democracy in Islam: Essential 
Writings of ʻAbdolkarim Soroush. pg. xix. 
 
4 Haj, Samira. Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition: Reform, Rationality, and Modernity. pg. 4. 
 
5 Asad, Talal. The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam. pg. 14. 
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necessarily change over time to confront new events in the present—a nearly identical 
description of the process Iran’s reflexive revivalists adhered to in their reinterpretations of 
Islamic theory.  
Second, Talal Asad suggests that a fundamental notion of ‘the secular,’ from which 
various iterations of secularism can arise, must not be viewed as a simple separation of ‘church 
and state.’ Rather, he suggests that a secular ethic emerges as a combination of ideas, practices, 
and traditions over time that produce a Rawlsian notion of ‘overlapping consensus.’ This idea of 
creating overlapping consensus is central to an understanding of secularism that is essentially 
fluid and malleable depending on how such an ‘overlapping consensus’ is uniquely constructed 
within various national contexts.6  In this light, the Iranian intellectuals’ Islamization of 
secularism should be understood as the creation of an overlapping consensus through their 
common desire to institutionalize the fluidity of human religious knowledge and establish a non-
coercive democratic state that allows political agency to rest in the hands of the governed, not a 
static political or religious ideology. Through this theoretical framework, the Islamization of 
secularism is best understood as the fundamental necessity for secular and democratic 
institutions in order for an ever-changing Islamic discursive tradition to be politicized.  
It is crucial, however, to also look at the practical application of this revolutionary theory 
both in Iran and the contemporary Middle East to see how it effects the everyday lives of the 
social agents themselves. Though Iran remains a repressive authoritarian regime, this reformist 
vision of an Islamic secular democracy is still very much alive within Iranian civil society. The 
best evidence of this was the 2009 Green Movement protests, which both demanded democratic 
                                                          
6 Asad, Talal. Formations of the Secular. pg. 2-5; 16. 
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accountability and reform, and meaningfully exposed the conservative regime’s façade of 
democratic legitimacy for all of the world to see. 
Perhaps the greatest pragmatic success of this new theoretical discourse can be found not 
in Iran itself, but within Shi’ite political organizations across the Middle East, such as al-da’awa 
al-islamiyya in Iraq and al-Wifaq in Bahrain. Since the 1990s a groundbreaking trend of 
secularization within the leadership of these religious political parties has been increasingly 
evident. They have abandoned their connections to the esoteric clerical establishment and 
replaced them with lay intellectuals and politicians that still advocate religious principles but do 
so on an individual level without a clerical dictation of Islamic subjectivity. The fundamental 
core of the Iranian’s Islamization of secularism, however, was not intended to merely affect 
political parties, but was to create a lasting democratic institution. Even these lay political 
officials speaking in the name of Shi’a Islam have the capacity to become authoritarian and 
claim greater access to Islamic truth unless they are checked and balanced within a democratic 
system.  
Though the Iranians’ task today to establish democratic institutions in the central hub of 
politicized Shi’ite clerical authority is daunting and will likely take quite some time to achieve, 
their democratic theoretical discourse has profound implications for other Middle Eastern nations 
across the region who are presently in the process of democratic transition. As such, the explicit 
aim of this thesis is to answer the following question: What are the theoretical implications of the 
Iranian intellectuals’ Islamization of secularism for democratization efforts across the Middle 
East as they navigate their own unique balance between Islam, secularism, and democracy?  
 - 6 - 
The answer to this question is best understood in terms of four points of reference that Iran’s 
Islamization of secularism suggests about the changing relationship between Islam, secularism, 
and democracy in the post-authoritarian Middle East. 
 First, the use of objectivist, universalist, or ideological discourses speaking in terms of 
absolutes are unsustainable bases for democratic politics. They are inherently unchangeable and 
place political agency in the hands of a static ideal rather than in the hands of the people, which 
frequently leads to authoritarian politics of repression. Second, Islam is best understood as an 
ever-changing discursive tradition that lends an ethical and spiritual component to everyday 
political, social, and economic interactions. Third, secularism is best understood as the creation 
of a non-coercive overlapping political consensus that is uniquely indigenized within an 
individual nation. In Iran, the reflexive revivalists established this consensus by defining a 
secular state as being ideologically neutral so that political agency could rest in the hands of the 
governed. Finally, because there is no outline for governance in the infallible sources of Islamic 
truth, traditional methods of independent human reasoning (ijtihād) that look only the Qur’an 
and Sunna of the Prophet are insufficient. As such, the use of a new type of ijtihad that focuses 
not on the Qur’an and Sunna, but on religious and non-religious human reason is necessary to 
socially construct, critique, and reconstruct political paradigms over time.  
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Chapter One – Historical Framework Part One: Post-Colonial Secular and Islamic 
Thought in Iran 1953 - 1989 
 
 Chapter one presents the first portion of a historical framework through which to 
understand the emergence of the Islamization of secularism in Iran. This post-colonial theoretical 
era from 1953 – 1989 was dominated in large part by Cold War ideologies speaking in terms of 
universality and absolutes. The first portion of this chapter discusses the theoretical clashes 
between ideological secularism and Islam in Iran that would eventually contribute to the eruption 
of Islamic Revolution in 1978-79. The latter half of this chapter deals with post-revolutionary 
Iran’s institutionalization of Islamic ideology and a crucial divide that emerged between pro- and 
anti-clerical Islamist politicians regarding the structural identity of the Islamic Republic.  
From Secular Nationalism to a Repressive Secularism of Religious Evisceration 1953 - 1977 
In the early 1950s, Iran was a central theater for the Cold War and post-colonial political 
intervention. Though the British no longer physically occupied Iran in the aftermath of World 
War II, they maintained control over its oil industry for years, generating a deep resentment 
among an increasingly nationalist-minded Iranian public. In 1951, Mohammad Mossadegh, the 
leader of the secular-nationalist ‘National Front Party,’ headed up a passing of legislation in the 
Iranian Parliament (majlis) to nationalize the country’s British-controlled oil industry. This 
caused his popularity to skyrocket among the Iranian people and he was elected as the new Prime 
Minister by a landslide parliamentary vote in 1951.7  
The nationalization of Iran’s oil industry and Mossadegh himself presented the Shah with 
a serious challenge. Not only did his domestic popularity threaten the legitimacy of the Shah’s 
                                                          
7 Keddie, Nikki. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. pg.132-69. and Matin-Asgari, Afshin. “The Pahlavi 
Era: Iranian Modernity in Global Context” in Daryaee, Touraj. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. pg. 348-
65. 
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already questionable monarchy, but his nationalist ambitions also stripped the Shah’s Western 
supporters of a major source of oil wealth. In 1953, with the United States’ growing fear of 
Soviet influence in Iran, and at the behest of Western oil companies, the American CIA and the 
British MI6 launched a military coup to overthrow Mossadegh, putting an end to a period of 
pseudo-democratic politics in Iran.8 This solidified in most Iranians’ minds the idea that the West 
not only sought to exploit them for their natural resources, but also was willing to do so at the 
expense of Iran’s democratic freedoms and independence – a notion that would resonate for 
decades to come in Iranian society and among its intelligentsia.9  
With the Shah back in complete control over the state, he proceeded to eliminate the 
remaining secular-nationalist supporters of Mossadegh and completely dismantled the pro-
Soviet, Marxist Tudeh Party. By destroying or co-opting Iran’s two dominant political factions, 
the Shah created a vacuum that he would futilely attempt to fill with a ‘top-down’ project of 
modernization, secularization, and Westernization in the early 1960s. This ‘modernization 
project,’ known as the White Revolution (inqilāb-e sifīd), aimed to modernize the Iranian state 
by implementing what the Shah saw as the best path to a supposedly universal Western model of 
modernity. Using profits from oil wealth, he forcefully redistributed Iranian land from a semi-
                                                          
8 There is some debate about this western-orchestrated coup. Though the CIA and MI6 did play a central role, some 
have tried to lessen it, suggesting instead that domestic factions – namely a group of clerics associated with 
Ayatollah Khomeini – were responsible for generating enough genuine public support to launch the coup. I believe 
more contemporary anti-clerical political motivations are behind pinning the clerics as the primary movers against 
Mossadegh. Though there was some clerical opposition to Mossadegh that participated in the coup, the fact that the 
initial coup that was launched by the CIA failed is central to understanding why the clerics would support the second 
successful coup shortly thereafter. Without the CIA’s first failed attempt it would have been very unlikely that the 
clerics would have willingly launched one themselves. So, to diminish the role the CIA played, especially the money 
that was used to pay off hesitant opposition figures, would be to ignore well-documented facts.  Though I do not 
agree with the views held in the book, it is an interesting counterargument to the long-established narrative of 
Western unilateral intervention that warrants a response. Bayandor, Darioush. Iran and the CIA: The Fall of 
Mosaddeq Revisited. 
 
9 Keddie, Nikki. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. pg.132-69. and Matin-Asgari, Afshin. “The Pahlavi 
Era: Iranian Modernity in Global Context” in Daryaee, Touraj. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. pg. 348-
65. 
 - 9 - 
feudal landowning elite—many of whom made up the majority of the Iranian majlis—to a large 
number of Iranian peasant families, subsidized new businesses and industrialization, modernized 
Iran’s road systems and transportation networks, and provided women with a semblance of 
emancipation. The United States also provided the Shah with advanced military equipment that 
he used to equip his Israeli-trained secret police force, the SAVAK (Sāzmān-e Attelā'at va 
Amniyat-e Keshvar).10  
The few remaining supporters of the secular-nationalist and the Marxist political parties 
were supportive of the Shah’s social and economic reforms, though the success of his 
‘revolution’ was marginal at best. For example, though many Iranian peasants were given new 
land, the Shah’s industrialization and urban-focused development policies led to a mass 
migration from the countryside into the cities, negating the land redistribution policy’s benefits 
for most Iranians. Many of these newly urbanized Iranians brought with them a strong base of 
religious values, widespread illiteracy, and a desire for industrial employment, making it difficult 
for the Shah’s education reforms and limited industrial subsidies to fully account for an ‘ultra-
rapid’ trend of urbanization. 11  
Though the Shah’s modernization plans did produce marginal economic and social 
benefits, they failed to alleviate persistent economic stagnation for the vast majority of Iranians. 
Among the first to lash out against the Shah for his questionable modernization project was 
Ayatollah Khomeini.  He vehemently criticized the Shah for his adherence to a Western model of 
modernity that left little to no room for public expressions of Islam and that produced a 
fundamental reliance on the West. In 1963, due both to a lack of political alternatives after the 
                                                          
10 Ibid. 
 
11 Ibid. 
 - 10 - 
Shah’s purges of the secular-nationalists and Marxists, and by tactfully playing off of the 
religious values and economic discontent of the newly urbanized Iranian populations, Khomeini 
managed to incite a riot against the Shah’s Westernized regime. The Shah, operating through the 
SAVAK, responded ruthlessly, killing hundreds of Iranians and forcing Ayatollah Khomeini into 
exile. His exile, however, did not negate the effects of the revolt, which created a rapidly 
expanding and diverse Islamic opposition movement that would become a symbol of resistance 
against the Shah’s regime and its imperialist supporters. 12 
Following the 1963 revolt, the Shah asserted absolute rule for the next fifteen years, 
cracking down on any semblance of opposition. He especially focused his attention on the 
already marginalized Shi’ite clerical establishment (‘ulemā), fearing another popular uprising 
inspired by Khomeini and his fellow clerics. It was at this time that the secularization aspect of 
his surge towards Western modernity took on an entirely different meaning. Up to that point in 
the post-colonial political era, the notion of secularism was well integrated into a popular 
secular-nationalist discourse. It was understood as a simple absence of religion from the state, 
though the Shah frequently used some pro-regime clerics to boost his own legitimacy when it 
suited his interests. After 1963, however, the Shah sought to use secularism as a means of 
eliminating the political threat of the growing Islamic opposition movement. Under this forced 
separation of religion from society and the immense SAVAK oversight of religious gatherings, 
many clerics began to suggest that secularism was un-Islamic, an inherently Western innovation, 
and had been imposed to facilitate the declining social significance of religion as a whole.13 
                                                          
12 Ibid. 
 
13 Ibid. 
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Due to the Shah’s forceful separation of religion from society, secularism fell in line with 
a broader post-colonial political narrative of casting off the imperialist West. Especially among 
the newly urbanized Muslim populations, secularism came to be understood as an inseparable 
part of Western imperialism and the Shah’s repressive regime that it was enabling. Reza Shah’s 
vision of secularism was indeed synthesized from what he saw as a universal Western path to 
modernity, despite the fact that secular theory in the West itself was never singular in origin or 
expression.14 Despite its variable origins, the Shah sought to impose his own narrow vision of 
Western secularism from the top down, infusing it with his own anti-Islamic authoritarian bent. 
His hope to coercively replicate the successes of Western society from the top down generated 
little more than a summary Islamic rejection of secular thought, with the ‘ulema even deeming it 
pseudo-religious in nature (in an anti-religious, atheistic sense), and therefore always to be at 
odds with Islamic Truth.15 
Instead of creating a secular society that allowed for peaceful conflict resolution, 
religious freedom, and a non-coercive state structure, the Shah blatantly eviscerated religion— 
and Islam in particular—from every corner of public space. For example, he forcefully removed 
hijabs from Muslim women who willfully donned them in public; forced Shi’ite clerics to take 
tests to qualify to wear a turban; threw all members of the ‘ulema out of the schooling systems, 
replacing them with ‘secular,’ pro-regime figures; and forced a commingling of the sexes in 
Iran’s school systems.16 This strengthened the Islamic resistance forces and provided justification 
for a reactive and summary rejection of secularism in much of Iranian society.  
                                                          
14 Asad, Talal. Formations of the Secular. pg.25. 
 
15 Andresen, Joshua. "Deconstruction, Secularism, and Islam." pg. 375-92. 
 
16 Keddie, Nikki.Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. pg. 222.  
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Alongside the expanding Islamic opposition front, calls for nationalist and ‘cultural’ 
authenticity in the face of Western secular intervention strengthened, too. The forefather of this 
nativist intellectual movement was Jalal Al-e Ahmad, the son of a former anti-Shah cleric and a 
well-educated socialist activist. He manipulated an already popular third-worldist discourse, 
moving away from the idea of ‘neither East nor West,’ and specifically focusing on casting out 
the West, which he believed was a toxic roadblock to Iran’s path to modernity. This nativist 
aversion to Western secularism, though nationalist in origin, was readily taken up within the 
Islamic discourse as well, because many Iranians saw Islam as an essential part of their national 
identity.17 
 Islam as a Revolutionary Ideology of Authenticity and Spiritual Liberation 1963 - 1978 
Building upon his nativist opposition to the Shah’s secularization project, Jalal Al-e 
Ahmad turned his attention to the Shi’ite ‘ulema, upholding them as the only force that had 
remained independent of the West under the Shah. His evolving intellectual efforts to remove 
Western influence from Iranian society was articulated in his well-known book, ‘Westoxication’ 
(gharbzadigī). In its original Persian, the term gharbzadigi carries a vitriolic connotation, 
meaning more than just Western toxicity, but also suggesting a state of being stricken, afflicted, 
or beaten down by the West. By suggesting that the Shah’s toxic Western-oriented government 
was attempting to crush Iranian national identity, Al-e Ahmad lent a degree of nationalist 
legitimacy to the ‘unafflicted’ Islamic opposition movement.18 
After Al-e Ahmad’s death in 1969, ‘Ali Shari’ati moved to the forefront of the Islamic 
intellectual resistance, drawing on the success of Al-e Ahmad’s nationalist vision of the 
                                                          
17 Boroujerdi, Mehrzad. Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism. pg. 68-9. 
 
18 Ibid. 
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authenticity of Islam. Shari’ati, a Muslim sociologist, professor, and writer has been described as 
the most influential pre-revolutionary intellectual that, “did the most to prepare Iranian youth for 
revolutionary upheaval.”19 Others have criticized his intellectual legitimacy, lack of academic 
and Qur’anic references in his writing, and reactionary outlooks, describing him as a bombastic 
pseudo-intellectual that “wrote and spoke more than he ever read.”20 Regardless of his 
credentials, Shari’ati did indeed have a meaningful effect on pre-revolutionary Iranian society, 
namely for his contribution in transforming the Islamic faith into a politicized ideology. Shari’ati 
built this ideological vision of Islam largely on the intellectual efforts of Mohammed Iqbal, 
whose vision of Islam he described as, “paying careful attention to this world and the material 
needs of humanity, [but] also giv[ing] the human being a heart.”21 Indeed, Shari’ati similarly 
presented Shi’a Islam as more than just a faith or a set of personal practices and guidelines, but 
as an all-encompassing synthesis of everything from individual to social, political, and economic 
Truth. Shi’a Islam, in his view, already included all of the useful aspects of Western theory and 
society, though it perfectly corrected all of its imperfections and propensities for economic 
excess by attending to the spiritual needs of humanity.22  
Unlike Al-e Ahmad, who sympathized with the marginalized ‘ulema, Shari’ati sharply 
criticized the clerical establishment for allowing Iranians to adhere to an ‘opiate’ iteration of 
Islam that had left them vulnerable to exploitation and oppression from the imperialist West. He 
also went so far as to accuse the ‘ulema of polytheism for their usurpation of the Islamic faith to 
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appease the Shah, who he believed blasphemously forced the subservience of the Iranian people 
when they were to be submissive to God alone. In place of the ‘ulema’s Islam of inertia, Shari’ati 
advocated an iconoclastic vision of Islam as an ideology that would allow Iranians, and indeed 
all people, to reach the ‘pinnacle of their human existence.’ Through Islam, he believed that the 
world could overcome the ‘myopic consumerism’ of the West’s ideologies by letting Islam guide 
them to something greater than their physical existence.23   
Though Shari’ati was at the forefront of the Islamic intellectual movement that 
popularized this ideological understanding Islam, his prescriptions were rife with vague and 
idealistic prescriptions. For example, though he viciously attacked the clerical establishment for 
‘polytheism,’ at the same time he may have implicitly suggested their necessity, saying that 
Muslims must:  
Make the effort of interpretation [ijtihad] and oblige one group 
among them to specialize in the theoretical knowledge of Islam, the 
deducing of Islamic laws, and the resolution of the problems of 
society and the events of the time. They should confide to this group 
social and ideological leadership [taqlid] as well as well as the 
responsibility for the people’s destiny [emphasis added].24  
 
In this argument, Shari’ati conforms to the tradition of clerical emulation (taqlīd) via an 
exclusive—ostensibly clerical—role for ijtihad, though he provides little insight into who these 
‘leaders of destiny’ should be. This evolving intellectual tradition, in all of its vague ideological 
fervor, anti-Western nationalism, and undefined role for clerical authority, stoked the 
revolutionary spirits of the newly urbanized public. Iranians only needed what Shari’ati had 
                                                          
23 Shari’ati, Ali. Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique. pg. 111. For a description of Shari’ati’s 
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described as a ‘leader of destiny’ to help them bring down the Shah’s regime and all the 
fallacious Western theories it was built upon. 
 Ayatollah Khomeini, the man who would become such a ‘leader of destiny’ for millions 
of Iranians in the years leading up to the Islamic Revolution, remained persistent in his 
opposition to the Shah’s regime from exile in Iraq. In 1971, he began to devise a new style of 
Islamic governance that was neither a fully democratic republic nor a dictatorship. His vision for 
an Islamic state would be overseen by the Shi’ite ‘ulema, who he believed were best qualified to 
lead a community of believers in Islamic law and hermeneutics, though the degree and breadth of 
power they were to hold was never clearly circumscribed. In his book entitled Islamic 
Government (h̥ukūmat-e islamī), he articulated an idea of clerical political leadership that he 
called ‘Guardianship of the Jurists’ (velāyat-e faqīh). Velayat-e faqih was based on the idea that 
because the twelfth Shi’ite Imam is in Occultation that the community of believers needed to 
place their trust in a pious group of jurists (faqīh) to guide them in social, political, and legal 
matters.25 
Despite the warnings of numerous Ayatollahs and the support of nearly no one in the 
clerical establishment, Khomeini also sought to combine this juridical position of a faqih with 
the traditional Shi’ite role of marja’-e taqlīd. Marja’-e taqlid, meaning ‘Source of Emulation,’ is 
a well-established tradition whereby a high ranking member of the ‘ulema is selected as a 
marja’, who serves as a leading authority in religious matters, to which the other members of the 
‘ulema and all believers look for guidance. By combining this faqih and marja’ role into his 
theory of velayat-e faqih, Khomeini’s vision for a system of Islamic governance led by a single 
figure had great potential for continued authoritarian governance in Iran. Although Khomeini 
                                                          
25 Milani, Mohsen M. "The Transformation of the Velayat-e Faqih Institution: From Khomeini to 
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never publically articulated the idea of velayat-e faqih until after the 1978-79 revolution, his 
popularity among many Iranians grew significantly throughout the 1970s. This popularity, 
however, can be mostly attributed to his persistent voice of charismatic opposition against the 
Shah and not necessarily for his political theories or Islamic intellectualism. Despite his relative 
silence in the intellectual discourse at the time, his political theorization would eventually fit well 
into Shari’ati and Al-e Ahmad’s intellectual discourse that had paved the way towards a 
popularly-supported Islamic transition to power. The role for the clerical establishment within 
that Islamic political system, however, would be deeply contested for years to come.26  
Despite the mounting opposition of this Islamically-oriented social and intellectual 
movement, the Shah continued his top-down modernization program. A drastic increase in state 
oil revenue throughout the 1970s and rapid urbanization rates produced ‘uneven and erratic’ 
levels of economic growth, causing existing class disparities to become more pronounced. Many 
Iranians believed that they were witnessing the destruction of social justice at the hands of 
Western-oriented economic growth and all of its inherent excess. Indeed, many of these fears of 
excess were substantiated by the Shah’s wasteful spending on the most advanced military 
equipment and lavish national monuments while many poor Iranians lacked sufficient 
governmental support structures to ease increasing levels of urban poverty. This served to bolster 
Khomeini’s popularity among marginalized Marxist groups, too, as his rhetoric deftly took up 
hints of a class struggle at the behest of one of Shari’ati’s former colleagues and Khomeini’s 
greatest supporter—Ayatollah Mutahhari.27 
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27 Ansari, Ali. Modern Iran: The Pahlavis and After. pg. 246-51; 257. Ayatollah Muthhari was arguably one of the 
most influential figures behind Khomeini’s idea of velyat-e faqih. He has been described as the ‘theoretician’ of the 
Islamic Revolution, but was assassinated during the revolution itself by radical anti-clerical elements within Iran. 
His biography provides a useful discussion of his influence on Ayatollah Khomeini’s velyat-e faqih and ideas for an 
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Just before the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in late 1977, the Islamic intellectual 
and social movement was as diverse as the Iranian nation that it represented. These various 
interest groups, however, were united in their mutual opposition to the Shah under a vaguely-
defined banner of ideological Islam that drew from the intellectual efforts of Al-e Ahmad and 
Shari’ati. Khomeini’s political prowess, charismatic personality, and religious credentials 
allowed him to wrangle various divergent popular sentiments into this united front, though he 
intentionally left a well-defined role for Islamic governance and the clerical establishment out of 
his publicized rhetoric. Many left-leaning and non-religious Iranians could appreciate the moral 
dimension that Islam lent to their revolutionary aspirations, though many thoroughly 
underestimated the amount of political power that an Islamization of the opposition front would 
provide an already well organized clerical establishment.  
Though its specifics remained undefined, three dominant features of this nebulous 
Islamic social and intellectual opposition movement were: (1) a nativist insistence on the 
authenticity of ‘Iranian culture’ and the necessity to excise the imperialist West from society and 
politics, (2) an ideological interpretation of Islam as a perfect political theory that encompassed 
every aspect of life from social interactions to economic and political decisions, and (3) a 
necessary role for ‘true Muslims’ to interpret Islamic Truth in order to spiritually remedy the ills 
of the post-colonial world—a role that would ostensibly be best played by the clerical 
establishment. 
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The Islamic Revolution: Post-Colonial Islamic Intellectualism in Action 1977 - 1989 
In late 1977, the Shah and his regime felt confident in their absolute control. He had 
consolidated his power, imprisoning, exiling, or assassinating every source of opposition to his 
power—including both Ali Shari’ati and Khomeini’s son, Mustafa Khomeini. As a reflection of 
his confidence, the Shah decided to publish an article in the Iranian newspaper, Etela’at, that 
many assume was a response to the increasingly vitriolic commentary of Ayatollah Khomeini 
after the death of his son. The article slandered Khomeini’s reputation as the preeminent Shi’ite 
marja’ and sparked an uproar in the religious city of Qom. This initial wave of violently 
suppressed protests expanded over the next few months and was met with mixed responses from 
the Shah and the members of his regime. Initially, the Shah appeared unfazed by the popular 
mobilizations, but divided members of his government responded in opposite and 
counterproductive directions in lieu of an authoritative response from the Shah himself. Some 
wanted to respond favorably to the protests, issuing further promises of reform and conciliations 
while others encouraged the Shah to crack down on the protestors without remorse.28  
The division in his government reflected the Shah’s own vacillations throughout 1978, 
which served strengthened the opposition movement against him. On the one hand he appeared 
weak and desperately out of touch by attempting to reason with ‘his people,’ who in fact viewed 
him as quite distanced from reality and in the back pocket of the Western imperialists. On the 
other hand, he appeared frightened and insecure, frequently overreacting to minor protests with 
excessive violence. Due to the traditional Shi’ite practice of publically mourning an individual’s 
death forty days after their passing (chihilum), the Shah’s violent crackdowns exponentially 
expanded the protests, which often erupted at these mourning ceremonies. As another result of 
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his excessive brutality, the Shah’s regime was blamed for a deadly fire that killed 400 Iranians at 
‘Cinema Rex’ in the city of Abadan. Though the fire was started by a radical religious group, 
believable rumors that the SAVAK had started the fire and locked the people inside circulated 
quickly.29    
Protests continued to expand across the country and the Shah began making desperate 
conciliatory efforts, including implementing a civilian-led government under a hastily appointed 
prime minister, Shapur Baktiar. By the end of 1978, however, the Shah had completely lost 
control of his state and no amount of conciliation would return it to him. With the entire country 
gripped by protest and increasing divisions within the military, the Shah fled Iran in January 
1979, and the entire Pahlavi state collapsed the following month. Shortly thereafter, a national 
referendum was held and the decision to turn Iran into an Islamic republic was passed by a 
landslide popular vote. The Shah had been ousted, the imperialist West had been utterly cast out 
with him, and both were replaced the anticipated perfection of Islamic ideology.30  
Though the diverse groups that had converged under Khomeini’s leadership had been 
united in their desire to overthrow the Shah, their visions for what the Islamic Republic should 
look like after the Shah’s departure differed significantly. There were two primary groups within 
the Islamic movement that came to the fore in 1979. The first group, called the ‘republican 
Islamists’ or ‘liberal Islamists,’ foresaw their Islamic state as a democratic republic that should 
be guided by loosely-enforced moral principles, was neither aligned with the ‘East nor West,’ 
and provided little room for clerical political intervention. The second group, called the 
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‘Maktabis,’31 or ‘authoritarian Islamists’ were largely dominated by the clergy, who instead 
sought to establish a republic that was overseen by the ‘ulema with a less fluid vision of Islamic 
moral principles.32 
The divisions between these groups, who had been unified in their mutual opposition to 
the Shah, intensified in a struggle for the identity of the Islamic Republic. As the state apparatus 
under the temporary leadership of the republican, Mehdi Bazarghan, struggled to centralize 
authority, the pro-clerical camp gained significant coercive power through their control of the 
legal institutions, the Revolutionary Guard paramilitary force (pasdārān), and the security forces. 
These pro-clerical Islamists essentially created a ‘state within a state,’ controlling the 
mechanisms of force and coercion while the republicans only controlled parliamentary and 
bureaucratic positions. Most importantly, however, the pro-clerical Islamists maintained the 
support of a majority of Iranians, who had largely maintained rural outlooks, were semi-literate, 
and maintained deep sense of religiosity throughout the 1970s. Many of these recently urbanized 
individuals were politically reactive and supported only those individuals that could effectively 
communicate with them, who, at that time, was still Ayatollah Khomeini.33  
                                                          
31 The term maktabi is drawn from the Arabic and Persian word for book (kitāb), suggesting that these individuals 
had a ‘by the book’ doctrinal view of Islamic principles. 
 
32 The divergence in terminology used to describe these two groups is curious. I believe that for the first group, 
‘republican Islamists’ is the most apt description as these individuals were, by and large, dedicated to establishing an 
Islamically infused democratic republic. The term ‘liberal’ in my mind suggests a more western-oriented 
philosophy, though in reality, they were more interested in curbing the power of the ‘ulema through a democratic 
state rather than adhering to some normative understanding of Western liberalism. This collection of ‘republicans’ 
was composed of many different Islamic Marxists, leftists, and other disparate pro-democratic groups. The second 
group’s descriptions as ‘maktabis’ and ‘authoritarian Islamists’ is also misleading. Though many of these 
individuals did hold a stricter interpretation of Islamic principles that they sought to institutionalized through 
coercion if need be, they were mostly interested in securing a position for the ‘ulema in the new state. I also want to 
shy away from describing these pro-clerical Islamists as velayatis, becuase Khomeini’s idea of velayat-e faqih 
remained unarticulated at this early stage in the revolution. It is more important, therefore, to view this as a division 
over the role for the ‘ulema in the emerging republic, and less about their liberal or authoritarian bent. Regardless, 
the terms ‘republican Islamist’ and ‘authoritarian Islamist can be found in Ansari, Ali. Modern Iran: The Pahlavis 
and After. pg. 281. The terms ‘liberal Islamist’ and ‘maktabi’ can be found in Behrooz, Maziar. “Iran After 
Revolution” in Daryaee, Touraj. The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History. pg. 369-70. 
 
 - 21 - 
Khomeini sought to stem the growing anarchy, calling for a stop to ongoing protests and 
attempting to calm the masses through a ‘controlled bloodletting’ of the remaining members of 
the Pahlavi state. Nevertheless, the continued political polarization, fear of anarchy, and rampant 
assassination squads led to an increasingly authoritarian atmosphere both in the state and in the 
streets that was largely out of Khomeini’s control. In November 1979, despite Khomeini’s initial 
warnings against it, a group of zealous Iranian students attacked the United States embassy in 
Tehran, initiating the 444 day Iranian hostage crisis. This event proved remarkable for two 
reasons: First, it allowed Khomeini to unite many of the infighting political groups by focusing 
their attention on the ‘Great Satan’—the United States—instead of each other. With public 
attention diverted, it also allowed him to more fully consolidate his authority, redrafting the 
constitution in order to institutionalize his role as the leader of the revolution through the idea of 
velayat-e faqih. He argued that in order for the authority of the faqih to be fully institutionalized, 
it had to rest in the hands of a single figure. The actual responsibilities of his position as faqih 
remained entirely vague and malleable, however.34 
Second, the hostage crisis represented the utter casting out of the imperialist West from 
Iran, something that would draw great admiration from other post-colonially-fixated Middle 
Eastern nations. This victory for a ‘third way’ of Islam outside of the ‘East and West’ Cold War 
binaries inspired Muslims, Marxists, and third worldists alike, looking to Iran’s great victory 
over the West as a testament to the power of nationalist and Islamic authenticity. Most 
importantly, however, the revolution in Iran empowered Islamic organizations, which could 
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begin to see themselves as political leaders instead of just opposition figures.35 Looking for a 
way to avoid a similar unrest within his newly-established secular Ba’athist regime, Saddam 
Hussein turned his attention to the Islamic Republic, too. Acting both from a fear of the Islamic 
Revolution spilling over into the Shi’ite majority in Iraq and seeing a momentous opportunity to 
strike a longtime regional rival while its state and society was in a period of upheaval and 
transition, Saddam launched an invasion against the Islamic Republic in September 1980.  
The initial stages of the invasion were marked by minimal Iranian opposition to the Iraqi 
incursion. Instead of destabilizing the newly-established Iranian regime, however, Saddam’s 
attack actually served to strengthen Khomeini’s influence and power. The invasion crisis allowed 
a great deal of totalitarian government behavior to be overlooked for the sake of maintaining a 
cohesive defense of the Islamic Republic. Khomeini took this opportunity to consolidate the 
absolute power of the clerical government with him at the helm, launching a campaign of 
political and intellectual cleansing against his domestic opponents. Throughout 1981, 
Khomeini’s regime executed several thousand leftist republican Islamists, purging Iran of an 
entire tradition of anti-clerical and pro-democratic students, intellectuals, and politicians.36 
A strict interpretation of the revolutionary discourse of Islam as a perfect and liberating 
ideology had been effectively solidified under Khomeini’s leadership and he now called upon all 
true Islamic revolutionaries to defend the Republic with the sanctity of Islam at their back. With 
the domestic ‘threat’ neutralized and the hostage crisis coming to an end, Iraq proved a useful 
focus for all of the revolutionary zeal still circulating in Iranian society.  The revolutionary 
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guard, military, and the newly formed ‘popular mobilization’ militia (basīj), turned their full 
attention to the Iraqi invasion force, pushing Saddam back to the border and retaking the major 
city of Khorramshar in 1982.  For many Iranians, this victory proved to be a decisive 
substantiation of the sanctity and righteousness of their war for Islamic preservation.37 
In 1982, Khomeini and his government, motivated by what many believed to be an 
unstoppable force of righteousness, decided to go on the offensive in Iraq to claim the holy 
Shi’ite cities of Karbala and Najaf for the Revolution and liberate Iraq’s majority Shi’ite 
population from Saddam’s secular dictatorship. The Iranian government began to hold domestic 
rallies, changing their ‘sacred defense’ narrative into a mass-recruitment campaign of new 
‘martyrs,’ whose sacrifice would be invaluable to the revolutionary cause. Though Khomeini’s 
regime stoked the traditional Shi’ite guilt for not having sacrificed themselves with Imam 
Hussein in Iraq, created a cult of martyrdom that mobilized a generation of young Iranians by 
elevating them to a level of great societal importance, and directed all of the nation’s 
revolutionary Islamic fervor at the Iraqis, both he and his Islamic ideology would fail to achieve 
victory or any meaningful gain during the war.38  
During the ensuing eight year Iran-Iraq War, missiles were exchanged between the 
nations’ major cities, leading to billions of dollars in infrastructural damage and excessive 
civilian casualties. Hundreds of thousands of young Iranian men were killed in mass wave 
attacks and human landmine clearing tactics, with casualties increasing drastically when Iraq 
began to deploy chemical weapons on the battlefield in 1986. The United States, still enraged by 
the hostage crisis, also fed a continuous supply of modern armaments to the Iraqi state while 
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enforcing sanctions against Iran, crippling their already strained economy and making it difficult 
for them to secure their own modern armaments. 39  
After nearly eight years of costly stalemate, Khomeini emerged after submitting to a UN-
sanctioned ceasefire in 1988 with little more to show than an economy in a state of disrepair and 
an unmoved border with Iraq that was littered with the corpses of a generation of idealistic 
revolutionaries. Because Khomeini had so inseparably linked revolutionary Islamic ideology 
with the war effort, a national weariness with the war was also largely reflected in public 
opinions about the Islamic ideology on which the clerical government drew its legitimacy. By 
the end of 1988, revolutionary dynamism had subsided and Khomeini faced an overwhelming 
task of reasserting his interpretation of Islamic governance. When he passed away in 1989, 
however, an opportunity arose for the formerly marginalized pragmatists and leftists of the 
decimated republican Islamist camp to help redefine the Islamic identity of their Republic. 
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Chapter Two – Historical Framework Part Two: Post-Authoritarian Secular and Islamic 
Thought in Iran 1989 – 2004 
 
Chapter two presents the second portion of a historical framework through which to 
understand the Islamization of secularism in Iran. This post-authoritarian theoretical era began in 
1989 after the Iran-Iraq War, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, and the winding down of the 
Cold War, which created a domestic and international context that was conducive to the creation 
of new theories. Indeed, during the early 1990s, there was a stark discursive shift away from 
ideological Islam and secularism that had dominated the post-colonial theoretical era and 
towards a narrative of democratic reform. The first portion of this chapter discusses the evolving 
rift in Iranian politics between the pro-clerical conservatives and pragmatists and the anti-clerical 
leftists. This pro- and anti-clerical divide would transform again by the beginning of 1997, with 
the pragmatist Islamists shifting their alliances to a redefined anti-clerical leftist group, thus 
creating the political foundation of the Iranian Reform Movement. The latter half of this section 
focuses on the intellectuals within that anti-clerical reform movement and their development of 
the democratic theory of Islamic secularism.   
Khamene’i, Rafsanjani, and the Reconstruction of the Islamic Republic 1989 - 1997 
 Khomeini’s death in 1989 created a power vacuum again in Iranian politics. He left no 
indication as to who would be his successor as the leader of the Islamic Republic (rahbar), 
though the constitution mandated that the rahbar be chosen from among the highest ranking 
marja’iyyat (plural for marja’). The conservative elite that controlled the Islamic government, 
however, did not find any of the marja’iyyat politically suitable to their interests to hold this 
position. Following Ayatollah Montazeri’s ascendance to Khomeini’s former position as the 
preeminent marja’, the conservative leadership deftly pointed out that he had resigned as 
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Khomeini’s disciple and rightful successor after he publically criticized some of Khomeini’s 
decisions towards the end of his life. With Iranian society in a state of mourning and disbelief 
after Khomeini’s death, political infighting increasing over the empty role of rahbar, and no 
‘suitable’ marja’ to fill the position, an alliance between the conservative and pragmatist Islamist 
elite began to form.40  
This alliance, led by Hujatolislam Ali Khamene’i and Iran’s newly-elected president, 
Akbar Rafsanjani, issued a referendum to redraft the constitution—an undertaking that was 
widely supported in the disillusioning wake of the Iran-Iraq War. They implemented three major 
changes to the structure of the state, none of which meaningfully responded to the 
disappointment Iranians felt towards their Islamic state after the war, but rather, served the 
alliance’s political interests. First, they removed the position of Prime Minister, effectively 
purging leftist political influence from the Iranian state. The role of prime minister was 
frequently held by this leftist camp, a group that comprised many of Iran’s former republican 
Islamists, secular-nationalists, and socialists. During this period, the leftists had lost much of 
their sway with the Iranian people, too, as they had pursued a state-based economic strategy 
throughout the Iran-Iraq War that was largely unsuccessful. By removing this position of Prime 
Minister, Rafsanjani and Khamene’i greatly increased the power of Iranian presidency and 
purged the anti-clerical leftists from politics yet again.41    
Second, their redraft of the constitution removed the requirement for the rahbar to be a 
marja’-e taqlid, allowing for lower-ranking clerics to serve as rahbar and providing the ruling 
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elite with a wider range of individuals to choose from at their discretion. With this ruling, 
Hujatolislam Ali Khamene’i was selected by the conservative-dominated Guardian Council 
(shūrā-ye negahbān-e qānun-e assāssī) as the next rahbar and was quickly promoted to the rank 
of Ayatollah. 42 Khamene’i’s religious credentials were nowhere near sufficient to have him 
considered to be a marja’, much less an Ayatollah, causing his religious leadership to be 
questioned by both higher-ranking clerics and Iranians alike. As a further complication, because 
Khamene’i was not a marja’ all believers did not have to adhere to his guidance as rahbar, but 
could look instead to higher-ranking clerics for guidance. This allowed room for discrepancies to 
arise between the official state rulings and those of other Shi’ite clerics that outranked 
Khamene’i. Khamene’i, therefore, required something more to legitimize his position as 
rahbar.43    
 The final amendment to the constitution would provide Khamene’i with the level of 
further control that his lacking religious credentials necessitated. He redefined the foundation of 
the Islamic Republic from velayat-e faqih to velayat-e mutlaq-e faqih, meaning Absolute 
Jurisistconsult. Though Khomeini had presented this idea in the early stages of his theorization 
about velayat-e faqih, it was never implemented because he had initially intended to create a 
relatively democratic ‘guardianship,’ not an authoritarian state. After Khomeni’s death, however, 
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velayat-e mutlaq-e faqih proved useful to ensure Khamene’i’s authority over other clerics to 
compensate for his questionable religious credentials. This addition of ‘absolute’ (mut̥laq) to his 
guardianship meant that he had the final word in everything religious, judicial, social, and 
economic in the Islamic Republic. Though it did not confer a level of infallibility upon his 
decisions, something reserved for the Shi’ite Imams alone, it did suggest that Khamene’i’s 
authority was not conditional or restricted (muqayyid), but all-encompassing. This meant that as 
the supreme leader, he could ‘suspend’ the rulings of other clerics if he deemed that a different 
course of action would better serve Islam as a whole.44  
 During this constitutional consolidation of conservative power, President Rafsanjani 
successfully led the reconstruction of Iran after the devastation of the Iran-Iraq War. He oversaw 
the gradual rebuilding of Iran’s cities, building parks, recreation areas, concert halls, and other 
major civic centers that allowed for a high degree of public interaction and commingling of the 
sexes in safe and religiously-acceptable settings. There was also a major population boom 
following the revolution, and by the end of the 1990s, Iran’s population would be twice what it 
was in 1979, creating a strain on Iran’s already fragile economy. Though Rafsanjani was unable 
to fully revive the economy, due in large part to this population boom and the Western 
embargoes that remained in effect since 1979, he did successfully privatize some sectors of the 
state, providing new opportunities for business and industry.45     
 In the early 1990s during this reconstruction period, Mohammad Khatami, who would go 
on to win the presidency in 1997, was the minister of Islamic Guidance. As minister, he 
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controlled the degree of ‘cultural freedom’ Iranians had in publications, art, theater, movies, and 
music. With the approval of Rafsanjani, Khatami eased restrictions on cultural modes of 
expression, allowing for a circulation of new ideas and expectations about democracy and civil 
society via the press and cinema. Due both their waning support within Iranian society and the 
regime’s persistent political purges, the leftists were forced to regroup and rethink their political 
stance. This easing of restrictions provided them with an opportunity to reshape their political 
platform away from a focus on state-based economics, turning instead to democratic reform, 
freedom of expression, and civil rights to appeal to a new generation of Iranians, who were at the 
heart of this brief period of free expression. Despite Khatami’s removal from his position of 
Minister of Islamic Guidance in 1992, this moment of cultural openness created a path to an 
innovative reform-based political platform for the leftists and an expectation of greater political 
accountability and freedoms within civil society.46 
 The population boom in Iran after the revolution did strain the country’s economy, but it 
also led to a vast increase in the number of educated individuals in urban city centers. In 1979, 
the number of students in Iran’s university system numbered about 175,000. This figure did not 
change very much throughout the eight year Iran-Iraq War, but in the early 1990s, Iran’s 
university population shot up to over 1.25 million students. To account for this vast increase, 
reconstruction efforts also included a focus on expanding the number of state-run higher 
education institutions in Iran from 26 at the time of the revolution to 87 by 1997. Private sector 
‘Islamic University’ systems also sprung up to complement the state’s efforts, establishing more 
than 100 new religious universities throughout the 1990s. This drastic increase of both men and, 
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most notably, women, attending university added to an intensifying atmosphere of new 
expectations for democracy, civil rights, and pragmatism. 47 
This population of students flooding the university systems was largely made up of Iran’s 
new youthful generation, who were too young to remember the revolution and numbered 
approximately half of the entire population by the mid-1990s. These young people were at odds 
with the invasive religious restrictions that the state had put on them in the name of an Islamic 
Revolution, in which they had played no role. Because they had grown up during the Iran-Iraq 
War, too, most of what they knew of the Islamic Republic was based on its failures on the 
battlefield and pervasive popular sentiments of despair and disenchantment with revolutionary 
Islamic ideology. As a result, many of Iran’s youth turned to ‘degenerate’ behavior as a means of 
opposition to the Islamic government and the omnipotent moral police. Prostitution, drug 
addiction, and a wide-spread refusal to participate in religious practice were common place 
among this new generation as a means of escaping what they believed to be a hopeless political 
and social situation.48  
In spite of such a drastic outpouring of rebellious and anti-religious behavior, there was 
not a loss of religious sentiment or interest in Islamic theology among many of them. Rather, 
Iranian youths shared a desire for a more inclusive vision of Islam that allowed them to be 
religious, hold diverse political views, and enjoy whatever movies, books, and music they 
wanted. They called this new vision of Islam the ‘Religion of Life’ (dīn-e zindigī), a more 
relaxed combination of faith, individual freedom, and fun that was inconsistent with the 
conservative government’s plan to produce a dutiful generation of ‘young true Muslims’ that 
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adhered to the revolutionary values of cultural authenticity, anti-imperialism, and Islamic 
justice.49  
The revolutionary paradigm had shifted by the mid-1990s, and nearly 80 percent of Iran’s 
youth were either completely opposed or indifferent to the Shi’ite clergy and the conservative 
Islamic state. A new wave of religious intellectuals, who had politically associated themselves 
with the reform movement, had an immense opportunity to reach out to these unrepresented 
young people. These lay and clerical intellectuals did precisely that, establishing a theological 
basis for this din-e zindigi that blended a more tolerant version of Islam with democratic and 
even secular political theories. Indeed, from 1992 to 1997, youthful attendance at academic 
lectures by this group of religious intellectuals far surpassed state-led religious gatherings.50   
 A unified ‘Islamic Feminist’ movement also emerged in the 1990s that complemented the 
democratic and human rights demands of Iran’s growing civil society. This feminist movement 
focused on pragmatism and achieving attainable results, pushing political ideology and religious 
differences aside for the sake of women’s rights. For example, instead of trying to overturn the 
requirement for all women to wear a veil, they sought to introduce new, more fashionable veil 
options. They also fought for equal opportunities in university systems and the workforce for 
women of all social classes. The emergence of this pragmatic discourse within the feminist 
movement, coupled with the vast increase in well-educated students of both genders attending 
universities, fostered a new class of politically active and cosmopolitan young men and women. 
With the 1997 presidential elections approaching, the candidate who could relate best to a 
narrative of pragmatism and the expectations of greater political openness and human rights 
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circulating around university campuses and intellectual circles, would have a good chance at 
claiming the presidency.51 
Khatami’s Election and the Rise of the Iranian Reform Movement 1997 - 2004  
 Mohammad Khatami, who retained much of his popularity for easing the restrictions on 
modes of cultural expression in the 1990s, emerged as the the presidential candidate representing 
the new Iranian left in 1997. His campaign reached out to women and young voters alike, 
focusing on democratic reform, civil rights, relaxing restrictions on the media, and allowing civil 
society to freely expand once again. It was at this time that the Iranian left under Khatami’s 
political leadership became known as the reformists, uniting under his political promises for 
democratic reform and relaxation of government restrictions. The 1997 elections in Iran shocked 
both the conservative establishment and this new reformist party, with an unprecedented 80 
percent voter turnout. Iran’s youthful population made its voice heard, with over two thirds of 
the overall vote going to Mohammad Khatami.52  
Khatami’s unexpected election would prove to be a momentous opportunity to implement 
change before the conservative establishment and Ayatollah Khamene’i could fully control it. 
Among the first things Khatami did was reopen the press and media, allowing the reformist 
intellectuals and journalists to articulate their ideas for change in hopes of ‘reigniting the fading 
revolution’ for a new generation of Iranians. Despite the conservative establishment’s best 
efforts to reign this in—frequently through the use of brutality, assassinations, and warnings of 
the toxic incursion of Western cultural imperialism—the spread of democratic plans for reform 
with Islam at their core spread rapidly through the university campuses, youth-based intellectual 
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circles, and reformist publications. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, the reformists won the 
majority of seats, too, placing this grassroots political movement for democratic and religious 
reform in control of two of the three branches of the Iranian government.53 
 The third branch of the Islamic Republic, however, remained fully in control of 
Khamene’i and the conservative establishment. Khamene’i acted as commander in chief of the 
armed forces and the basij militias, controlled the judiciary and the guardian council, and had 
essentially bought off the loyalty of the Revolutionary Guard (pasdaran) during the 
reconstruction period, giving them private ownership over large portions of Iran’s oil and 
business sectors. With absolute control of the state mechanisms of coercion, Khamene’i could 
imprison, execute, and dismiss members of the reform movement at his discretion. Though the 
conservatives unequivocally lost every popular election, they still managed to receive ten to 
twenty percent of the vote, giving them control over a “potent, militant, and violent social base,” 
that they could use to intimidate and mobilize against the reform movement in the streets if 
necessary.54 
The Reflexive Revivalists and the Reconceptualization of Secularism 
With his absolute power over the judicial system and military branches, Ayatollah 
Khamene’i could limit the political mobility of the reform movement within the state apparatus 
and could keep popular demands for freedom of self-expression at bay with constant oversight 
from his basij militias and the pasdaran. What he feared most, however, was the reform 
movement’s intellectuals, many of whom were well versed in Islamic theology, had impeccable 
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revolutionary credentials, and appealed to a new generation of Iranians and their demands for 
freedom and democracy. The most prominent among these intellectuals was ‘Abdolkarim 
Soroush, who has been deemed by some to be the “Martin Luther of Shi’a Islam.”55 Soroush 
studied Islamic theology, philosophy, and history both in Iran and Europe and returned to Iran 
during the revolution to help the new government establish curriculums across the expanding 
university system. He also taught at Tehran University where he played a significant role in 
disseminating his new vision of Islamic, democratic, and even secular political theories to the 
burgeoning student populations. He was thrown out of the university in 1996 by Khamene’i’s 
regime, however, and has since then spent much of his time abroad, continuing to press for 
reform in Iran.56 Soroush, along with fellow professor and mid-ranking cleric Muhammad 
Mojtahed Shabestari, inaugurated a trend of Islamic intellectual reform that provided the 
theological base for the reform movement’s democratic aspirations and young Iranian’s new 
expectations of Islam as din-e zindigi.  
 Supporting the religious reformers’ theological work with Islam and democracy was 
another group of intellectuals called the secular-modernists. This group was made up of theorists 
such as Akbar Ganji, probably the most famous reformist journalist and modern secular 
intellectual, and Abbas Milani, an author on Persian modernism, professor, and pro-democracy 
activist. It was these individuals that were responsible for shifting the reform movement’s 
understanding of secularism away from the West-centric aspirations of secular mimicry during 
the Shah era and the subsequent demonization of it as ‘culturally inauthentic’ during the 
revolution and throughout the post-colonial political era. They also presented the idea of 
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‘modernity’ as a continuous adaptation of existing traditions—including Islam—to confront 
present circumstances.57 
 This combined group of new intellectuals was unique in their outlook. They were true 
reformers in the sense that they did not advocate for an overthrow of the Iranian regime or the 
Islamic Revolution from which it drew its legitimacy, but rather, they sought to revive the 
revolution through new Islamic, democratic, and secular theories. Beyond simply being 
reformers, however, these intellectuals are more aptly described as ‘reflexive revivalists.’ They 
were reflexive in that they no longer blamed the West or the outside world for their domestic 
conditions. Instead, they looked inwards, drawing on their own historical experiences throughout 
the post-colonial era to establish a pragmatic and indigenous vision of Islamic and secular 
democracy for a post-authoritarian Iran. They were revivalists in the sense that they did not seek 
to fundamentally change Islamic truth, but focused instead on questioning Islamic exegesis and 
drawing a line of distinction between fallible human knowledge and infallible Islamic Truth.58 
Through their collective efforts, these reflexive revivalists undertook an ‘Islamization of 
secularism’ to produce a multi-faceted secular and religious democratic theory that represented, 
on an intellectual level, the political activity of Khatami’s reform movement and its vast support 
structure among Iran’s female and youth populations.  
Their conception of a secular state, however, must not be understood as Soroush says in 
terms of, “a deliberate effort to exclude religion from worldly affairs,”59 as it had been 
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throughout the post-colonial era, but rather, “as a regime in whose polity no values and rules are 
beyond human appraisal and verification and in which no protocol, status, position, or ordinance 
is above public scrutiny.”60 Similarly, this secular state according to Akbar Ganji is, 
“ideologically neutral…[and one in which] the state does not have the right to interfere with 
religion, but religion, like any other institution in civil society, can be involved in ongoing 
politics and publically express its own criticisms.”61  
There is very little divergence between the secular-modernist and religious reformers’ 
understandings of secular theory. Both groups focus resoundingly on some sort of governmental 
neutrality with regards to ideology that ensures political agency is in the hands of the governed 
and not a restrictive political or religious ideology. Secularism, in their view, was an inseparable 
aspect of any democratic society, as it ensured the right of individuals to change their state’s 
structure over time.62 Soroush believed that this change over time was necessary because human 
political and social constructs—government itself, for example—are fundamentally fallible and 
fluid. Religion, however, can enter into this secular system, he believed, by means of its people. 
He said that in this secular and religious society, “it is not religion per se that arbitrates, but some 
understanding of religion which is, in turn, changing, rational, and in harmony with the 
consensual and accepted extra religious criteria.”63 This extra religious criteria, or ‘overlapping 
consensus,’ that he mentions here is the non-coercive democratic system itself that is 
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fundamentally representative of and responsive to the popular will. If religion is an aspect of that 
popular will, it can influence and operate within a secular state. 
Along similar lines, mid-ranking cleric, Mohammad Shabestari suggested that, God has 
decreed to “let the world be the world” and that the faithful must know “to what extent they can 
expect religion to solve their secular problems,” because, he continues, “it is not perfection for 
religion to function as a substitute for science, technology, and human deliberation.” Democracy 
and secularism are human social constructs, he says, and:  
cannot be derived from the meaning of faith or the religious texts. 
However, since social realities demand such a form of government, 
people of faith must forge a relationship with this reality, reconcile 
themselves with its requirements, and follow a faithful life along its 
riverbed.64  
 
Soroush added to this, suggesting that this ‘social reality’ that necessitates secularism was simply 
to prevent ideological coercion from eroding the foundations of democracy. “The only thing that 
is required of a secular democracy” he said, “is tolerance of different points of view and their 
advocates.” This ‘secular tolerance’ would act as the underlying foundation of democracy and 
adhering to it would not require believers to renounce their own beliefs, but rather would be a 
“concern [of individual] believers” and their ability to accept different viewpoints from their 
own.65  
To briefly summarize, secularism as a theoretical tradition has undergone drastic changes 
since the post-colonial era in Iran. During the post-colonial theoretical era, it was interpreted by 
most Iranians as a forceful separation of religion from the state. This was substantiated by the 
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coercive secularization program between 1963 and 1977 under the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi 
for the purpose of maintaining his own political power. Such a forceful marginalization of 
religion bred a monolithic nativist rejection of secularism as a purely Western and inherently un-
Islamic theory that persisted in the popular discourse until the early 1990s. During the post-
authoritarian political era, however, secularism was reinterpreted by reflexive revivalist 
intellectuals. They produced a multifaceted secular and religious democratic theory that 
advocated for a neutral state apparatus that would allow religion and extra-religious traditions to 
peacefully intermingle and engage in critical discussion with one another.  
The idea of a secular democracy was pragmatically indigenized by these intellectuals to 
produce what secular-modernist Abbas Milani believed to be a revival of historical Persian 
encounters with the idea of democratic modernity. Historically, he said, “Persians were not only 
open to other cultures, but freely adopted all they found useful from them. Indeed, an eclectic 
cultural elasticity has been said to be one of the key defining characteristics of the Persian spirit 
and a clue to its historic longevity.”66 This cultural elasticity and pragmatism extended beyond 
the debate on secular theory, and was also evident in the reflexive revivalists’ Islamic 
reformations. 
The Reflexive Revivalists and the De-Ideologization of Islam 
Soroush emerged at the fore of Islamic reforms as well, drawing on an enduring Islamic 
intellectual tradition that can be traced back through ‘Ali Shari’ati. To begin his reform efforts, 
Soroush steeply criticized Shari’ati’s efforts to ideologize Islam. He believed that “making 
religion ideological erodes its timeless and eternal message and nature, making it applicable only 
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to specific circumstances and times.”67 By turning Islam into an ideology, the Iranian 
revolutionary government had created a temporally bound vision of what Islamic government 
should be at the time it was implemented. In the late 1970s, ideological Islam provided the 
revolution the momentum that it needed to overthrow the Shah and defend itself from the Iraqi 
invasion in the 1980s. By the 1990s, however, the same Islamic ideological paradigm was no 
longer prevalent and yet the repressive authoritarian structures of the state that still drew on that 
revolutionary paradigm for its legitimacy remained in place. Islamic ideology at that point, 
Soroush said, became, “highly susceptible to dictatorship,” producing an esoteric class of official 
interpreters who, “slam shut the gates of thought and treat the ruling ideology as if it represented 
the perfection of reason.”68 
Like Shari’ati, however, Soroush saw Islam as adding an essential spiritual and moral 
component to social, political, and economic interactions. He argued that strictly ‘liberal 
societies’ deleteriously ignore the existence of God by focusing the entirety of their efforts on the 
satisfaction of human beings, leading to excessive consumerism, immorality, and social injustice. 
On the other hand, strictly religious governments—like the current regime in Iran—supposedly 
“attended exclusively to divine, not human, mandates … [and] assumed people’s satisfaction was 
contingent upon and a natural by-product of God’s satisfaction.”69 Both of these extremes, he 
suggested, were improper applications of Islam. Instead, he believed that there needed to be “a 
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balance between the religious and non-religious to do right by both people and by God, 
acknowledging at once the integrity of human beings and of religion.”70  
In this balance, he recognized that there would not be a lasting consensus as to how 
divinely-focused and how worldly-focused social, economic, and political interaction would be. 
He therefore advocated for a mutual tolerance (tasāmuh̥) to “allow a coexistence of religious and 
secular people, free from antagonisms that result from unequal rights and the imposition of one’s 
beliefs on another.”71 In this view, Islam was not a static ideology or set of intolerant guidelines, 
but a moral ethic that could be applied to varying degrees within daily interactions for the sake of 
striking a balance between the oneness of God and His infallibility, and humanity’s pluralistic 
and fallible nature.  
For this tolerant balance between religious and worldly to be successful, Soroush and 
Shabestari continued by undertaking the task of further dividing Islamic truth between infallible 
and fallible sources. Their division, however, transcended the traditional separation of the 
infallible Qur’an and Sunna from fallible ijtihad and jurisprudence (fiqh), moving a step further 
by suggesting that there was an explicit division that needed to be drawn between accepted 
religious knowledge and the fundamentally fluid nature of all human knowledge. Accepted 
religious knowledge, Soroush said: 
meaning our knowledge of the Qur’an and the Sunna—is human 
knowledge, and, similar to other sciences, must be in constant flux, 
evolution, and contraction and expansion. This contraction and 
expansion is directly produced by contractions and expansions in 
other areas of human knowledge, and understanding of [religious 
knowledge] is not independent of our understanding of nature and 
science, and changes in relation to it. Therefore, just as philosophy 
and natural sciences are imperfect and continue to evolve, the 
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sciences of jurisprudence and interpretation and ethics and 
disputation are also imperfect and also must continue to evolve.72 
 
This means that the accepted religious knowledge generated by clerical ijtihad, for example, 
necessitates a further degree of ijtihad that would be continuous in nature and focused on reason 
itself, not the Qur’an and Sunna. This continuous ijtihad (ijtihad-e mustamar) required that the 
believer also look at extra-religious sources, too, in order to properly produce religious 
knowledge in relation to the present realities of the time period.  
 Similarly, Shabestari argued that this ‘continuous ijtihad’ would allow for ‘dynamic’ 
interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna. He believed that, “we cannot continue imitating [taqlid] 
past faqihs [Islamic jurists], and, especially given the rapidly changing world around us, there is 
pressing need for new ijtihad on all fronts of Islamic knowledge.” Shabestari and Soroush here 
effectively issued a threatening challenge to the Iranian clerical establishment in control of the 
Islamic Republic. The entire notion of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurists) that the 
current regime is based on fundamentally relies on Iranians trusting the guardianship of the 
clerical establishment for the interpretation of Islam and its relation to the world. Soroush and 
Shabestari, however, challenge that notion by obligating Muslims to undertake their own reason-
centered ijtihad in a continuous and critical fashion of existing clerical ijtihad. 
This tradition of challenging clerical ijtihad is not new, however, and can be traced back 
in modern times to the 1930s and Ali Akbar Hakimizadeh. Hakimizadeh was a former cleric, 
who issued a forty page written attack called Thousand-Year-Old Mysteries against the clerical 
establishment. Though he denies the claim, it is widely assumed that Hakimizadeh’s criticism 
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prompted Ayatollah Khomeini to respond with his first book in order to reassert the authority of 
the ‘ulema.73 Hakimizadeh lashed out at the clerics for being misleading, monovocal, and 
preserving their own power by immediately condemning any opponents as apostates and pushing 
for their execution. He challenged the clerics to place their theories in front of the masses so that 
their ijtihad could be popularly reasoned with instead of, “spout[ing] off arguments in an empty 
arena … and fill[ing] millions of books with unverified nonsense.”74 Hakimizadeh offered up a 
similar challenge to traditional Shi’ite power structures, suggesting instead that the population of 
believers had a significant role to play in ijtihad, saying, “Nowadays, nothing but reason and 
logic can stop people from questioning what you [the clergy] argue. It is better to possess such 
reason and logic, but one cannot withstand the flood of popular sentiment with silence, 
excommunication, heresy, or executions; the only choice is to respond or resign.”75  
  Hakimizadeh’s call for a reason-based popular ijtihad of existing clerical ijtihad, 
however, was subsumed by post-colonial and imperialist political clashes that empowered the 
‘ulema as a barrier against foreign oppression and as guardians of the faith in the absence of the 
Imams. During the post-authoritarian political shift in 1990s, however, Soroush asserted himself 
as the latest reformer in opposition to the clerical establishment. He, like Shari’ati before him, 
believed that the clerical establishment was corrupt and unfit to lead a community of believers, 
though instead of condemning them of ‘polytheism’ as Shari’ati had, Soroush condemned them 
for their aversion to continuous rational thought and new scientific discovery.76 “The clergy” he 
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said, “is a syndicate group whose economic interests and livelihood depend on presenting and 
perpetuating specific, often petrified, interpretations of religion … Religious knowledge cannot 
progress and reach additional heights so long as it remains tied to the clergy’s syndical interests.” 
Instead, he suggested that the ‘spirit of reasonable inquiry’ was best served through democratic 
means by which the ‘ijtihad of the majority’ would be juxtaposed with the ijtihad of the clergy, 
all of which would therefore be guided by the ‘moral compass’ of evolving Islamic reason. 77  
Along similar lines, Mohammad Shabestari and Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, both clerics 
themselves, advocated for an obliteration of the clerical class altogether and a complete opening 
of the ‘gates of ijtihad’ for all believers. Eshkevari says that “Islam did not have a clerical class 
to begin with … [and] today, no one group, not even the clergy, can have a sole monopoly over 
the specialization of any one field.”78 Shabestari more deeply lashed out at the legitimacy of the 
clergy, specifically those at the heart of the Islamic Republic, saying that the Islamic Republic’s 
narrow interpretation of Islam, or, “jurisprudential Islam[,] … has become plagued with crises 
and problems that it can no longer properly govern. It cannot sustain itself because of its … 
frequent resort to violence in order to force itself on society, and its philosophical dearth and 
poverty.”79  
The significance of Soroush, Shabestari, and Eshkevari’s attack against the clerical 
establishment is profound. This argument for the necessity of a continuous, reason-based ijtihad 
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to be juxtaposed with existing clerical ijtihad, bears far greater weight than a simple opposition 
to repressive political power. It is also attempting to fundamentally restructure a long-standing 
Shi’ite tradition of taqlid—trusting the ijtihad of the clerics—by creating this additional layer of 
ijtihad based on reason itself (‘aql mehvar). Such an implementation of reason-based ijtihad, 
however, effectively complements a transition to democratic politics, whereby each individual or 
community of individuals uses independent reasoning to interpret knowledge of faith, science, 
and politics in relation to one another in order to produce their own conclusions. These 
conclusions can then be judged within a democratic forum whereby the will of the population is 
used to decide the best application of reason within a changeable secular state structure that is 
fundamentally necessary to preserve the capacity for continuous ijtihad (ijthihad-e mustamar) to 
take place. 
It is in this way that Iran’s reflexive revivalist intellectuals have Islamized secularism. As 
discussed in the introduction, this notion is best understood via what Talal Asad describes as the 
Islamic discursive tradition, thorough which Islam acts as an ever-changing interpretive tradition 
of present circumstances in relation to past experience and future expectations. The Islamization 
of secularism, in this light, is the latest manifestation of Iranian Islamic interpretations that are 
responding to the present demands of Iran’s youthful population in relation to past lessons 
gleaned from the post-colonial political era, and more specifically, the failures of the Islamic 
Revolution. 
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Chapter Three – Theoretical Framework: A Literary Review of the Theorists and their 
Interlocutors  
 
Chapter three discusses four theoretical themes within the ‘Islamization of secularism.’ It 
includes commentaries from the theorists themselves, which are placed into a discussion with 
other intellectuals, analysts, and historians of Middle Eastern politics, who have been influenced 
by or have come to similar conclusions as Iran’s reflexive revivalists. The four themes discussed 
here are: (1) the shift from post-colonial secularism to a diverse post-authoritarian understanding 
of it (2) the transition from post-colonial to post-authoritarian Islamic theory, focusing on the 
division of Islam into an ethical framework of reference and the inherent fallibility of all human 
knowledge of  Islam (3) defining the roles of Islam and secularism in a religiously-based 
democracy, and (4) democratic tolerance and the importance of understanding political traditions 
in terms of an evolving discourse of experiential knowledge. 
From Post-Colonial to Post-Authoritarian Secularism 
The concept of secularism in Iran and the Middle East has come under immense criticism 
from both within and without. These criticisms, though, largely focused on the blind acceptance 
of a supposedly universal or objective vision of secularism that was embodied by secular 
dictatorships and disseminated by a hubristic Western liberal discourse of hegemony throughout 
the post-colonial political era. Indeed, it was precisely this form of imposed and blindly adopted 
secularism that Jalal Ale-Ahmad, ‘Ali Shari’ati, and Ayatollah Khomeini sought to combat in the 
1960s and 70s, and was still a prevailing understanding that the reflexive revivalists had to 
redirect in the post-authoritarian era as well. 
As a point of entry into the evolving debate on secularism, ‘Ali Shari’ati’s encounter with 
the theory prior to the 1978-79 revolution is instructive. Shari’ati recognized that the strength of 
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a secular ‘society without God’ lay in its institutional structures,80 but he harshly condemned the 
effects of a secular democratic society saying that, “individual freedom without a specified 
direction, [would] be debased and reduced to a veritable cesspool of corruption and filth; [which 
was] certain to result in the pollution of freedom.”81 Here, Shari’ati referred to the lack of 
attention secular society pays to the human spirit. Though he recognized the value of these 
‘modern frameworks’ that secular society offered, because it ignored the spirituality of humanity, 
he believed that man would become ‘savage’ and ‘materialistic.’ Secularism, therefore, debased 
humanity’s desire for freedom by alienating them from a fundamental necessity of their human 
condition—spirituality.82 Shari’ati, however, failed to see the possibility for Islam to be 
cultivated and thrive within the individual, believing instead that secularism would cause Iranian 
Muslims to lose their faith unless Islam was institutionalized within the state itself. 
 Ali Mirsepassi, an Iranian-American professor, intellectual, and recent secular-modernist, 
directly confronts such monolithic and objective interpretations of secularism, advocating instead 
for a pragmatic adoption of secular institutional structures. He argues that, a ‘metaphysically 
interpreted’ version of secularism, if forcefully applied as had been done under the Shah’s 
regime in Iran, ignores the very valuable institutional structures and conflict resolution 
mechanisms that secular society provides. By ‘metaphysical’ he means that by turning 
secularism into an anti-religious ideology, it can no longer act in service of humanity and instead 
works in the service of a repressive ‘ideal.’ This causes institutional structures—like the 
judiciary or police force, for example—to focus their efforts on removing religion from the 
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public sphere in the name of some ideological secular ethic instead of allowing individuals to 
direct the path of the state. Furthermore, he argues that secularism has no claim to “universal or 
objective truth” in the first place and therefore must operate within the context it is applied to, 
not be blindly adopted from an externally synthesized model. Secularism, in this way, must be 
expressed differently in various times and places based on the context that it operates in and is, 
therefore, not static or objective, but is subject to interpretation.83  
Talal Asad’s query into the foundations of secularism and various ‘formations of the 
secular’ substantiates these viewpoints and also refutes secular objectivity, saying, “the secular is 
not singular in origin, or historical identity, it has shifted throughout the years and necessarily 
overlaps with religion—neither of which are fixed categories.”84 Like Mirsepassi, Asad suggests 
that secularism is fundamentally subjective in nature, and to unquestioningly imitate it based on 
a foreign entity’s formation of secularism is to also perilously assume the same domestic 
conditions and social climate. Instead, ‘the secular’ is best implemented through gradual and 
organic reform.85  
 Again, using ‘Ali Shar’iati’s argument as a useful point of departure, the claim that 
‘unguided humanity’ in a secular society would necessarily lead to ‘cesspools of filth,’ brings up 
the useful topic of public and private overlap in a secular society. Asad claims that a distinct 
separation between private and public cannot be drawn to suggest that a secular public is 
necessarily devoid of all religious influence in the first place. He says that, although the 
government structures themselves may not be based on religion, the people that act within them 
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have viewpoints shaped within both the private and public spheres. It is thus that individuals’ 
views, no matter the political system they live in, are shaped both inside and outside of the state 
apparatus.86 This means that, if a “cesspool of humanity” were to form within the contexts of a 
secular state, it would be a combination of a failure of the public sphere and private spirituality to 
direct the course of man. Furthermore, it suggests that a division between public and private 
spheres of influence is faulty in the first place as it is impossible to restrict the natural 
commingling of these domains of influence in any society unless done so through coercion.  
ʻAbdulkarim Soroush, aptly sums up the transformation of a supposedly objective 
secularism from a ‘foreign ideology’ that would facilitate the degradation of human spirituality 
to a useful theory that could be applied within Islamic thought and practice. He says:  
we must not take as a starting point of departure the assumption that 
what has not originated among us is necessarily alien to us … [nor 
should we] seek to establish the hegemony of one culture at the 
expense of others … [rather,] each culture contains elements for 
which it must repent and aspects it should uphold.87  
 
The important thing, he believes, is that secularism is neither “blindly emulated nor blindly 
rejected” based on some false objectivity or understanding of “Islamic culture as terminus.”88 
Secularism, he argues, also does not inherently cause a “decline of religion in society,” as 
Shari’ati suggested it would. Instead, he says, “we see the opposite … [with] the sharp 
dichotomies of the past, e.g. between secularism and religion, becoming blurred. They are relics 
of the positivist era, and are no longer tenable.”89 In this way, he challenges Shari’ati’s notion 
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that a secular society itself would necessarily prevent humans from attending to their spiritual 
needs. Instead, he argues that believers, “must stand in the agora of cultural exchange, fit, able, 
and willing to assume the task of defending the truth for [them]selves.”90 
From Post-Colonial to Post-Authoritarian Islamic Theory: Referential Divisibility and the 
Fallibility of Human Knowledge 
Expanding upon the reflexive revivalists’ reforms within the Islamic discursive tradition, 
reformers both in Iran and Middle East have continued to work against the notion of Islam as a 
perfect and complete political ideology. Instead, they have turned to something resembling a 
divisible set of faith-based ethics, or an evolving framework for inquiry that is based on 
incomplete human knowledge and therefore in need of continuous revision and supplementation. 
As both a point of comparison and departure, it is useful to look again at post-colonial visions of 
Islam as an ideological political theory from Ayatollah Khomeini and ‘Ali Shari’ati. Khomeini 
described the political application of Islam as the, “light of divine justice [that] shall shine 
uniformly on all and the divine mercy of the Qur’an… [that] shall embrace all like life-giving 
rain.”91 Indeed it was this unspecific and idealistic vision of Islam that was popularized in the 
1970s as the perfect light against the darkness of Western incursion.  
Similarly, Shari’ati saw Islam as the perfection of ideology:  
the efficacious combination of the three currents [inherent to 
humanity] of mysticism, socialism (equality), and existentialism 
(freedom) without the problems of one being able to overtake the 
goodness of another. As a combination of the three, Islam can 
overcome the subsumation of humanity by religious slavery, the 
materialism associated with equity, and the godless misdirection and 
materialism associated with an unguided free man.92  
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This definition of Islam in Shari’ati’s eyes was first and foremost the idea that it was the perfect 
completion of ideology for all time. He argued that it already had the West’s ideas built into it, 
but corrected their ills like materialism, for example, by attending to the human spirit and 
providing an absent moral dimension to political, economic, and social interaction. The second 
important concept to be taken from this is his idea that ‘unguided man’ would necessarily fall 
into misdirection and godlessness. Though simplistic, this idea that humanity needed a guide 
adhered to the Shi’ite tradition of taqlid, Ayatollah Khomeini’s notion of velyat-e faiqh, and with 
the idea that religion in the hands of individuals in the private sphere would not be sufficient to 
prevent their falling into godless alienation.  
In stark contrast to a vision of Islam as a perfect and static ideology is an interpretation of 
it instead as a divisible set of politically-applicable ethics. Tariq Ramadan, a widely criticized but 
influential author and cultural critic, advocates the notion of transcending post-colonial 
conceptions of Islamic objectivism through the use of an ‘Islamic reference’ within emerging 
secular and democratic societies. He envisions this ‘reference’ not as a static ideological 
foundation, but as “a corpus of principles that can orient and inspire political action” and as an 
‘applicable ethic’ that can transcend the ‘economic subservience’ associated with Western 
conceptions of liberal democracy and secular society by focusing on social justice and individual 
spirituality.93 
Samira Haj, a professor of Middle East studies and author specializing in Islam and 
modernity also offers some unique analysis that complements the idea that Islam is not an inert 
or indivisible ideology. Haj presents the argument of Talal Asad that Islam is a discursive 
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tradition that is interpreted and reinterpreted based on historical experience and textual sources 
extending through the past, present, and into the future. Via this interpretation of Islam as an 
evolving discursive tradition, she makes the argument that it is best understood as a ‘framework 
of inquiry’ through which Islamic reformers and everyday people can interpret their present 
based on a set of historical debates and textual truths.94 By suggesting that Islamic traditions are 
essentially socially and historically-situated references, Haj would agree with Ramadan that 
Islam is not a monolithic ideology that is perfectly static, but rather, serves as a framework of 
experiential religious knowledge for current and future interpreters. 
Soroush and his fellow intellectuals usefully sum up their own vision of this historically-
situated ‘framework of inquiry.’ Soroush suggests that because the infallible religious texts of 
Islam do not contain an outline for a specific form of government, Islam as a politicized ideology 
is nothing more than fallible human knowledge, not the epitome of ideological perfection that 
Shari’ati and Khomeini believed it to be.95 Echoing this point, Mohammad Shabestari argues that 
human religious knowledge—which Islam as an ideology is derived from—is a fallible source of 
human intuition that is incomplete and that must be supplemented with ideas like secularism and 
democracy, for example. “The meaning of perfection of religion is not that it contains everything 
under the sun,” he says, “so that if we were unable to find a specific item in it we should go off 
calling it imperfect. It is not perfection for religion to falsely function as a substitute for science, 
technology, and human deliberation.”96 In this view, Islam can serve as a framework of 
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reference, for example, but is not going to provide a framework for all aspects of the human 
political, economic, and social experience as Shari’ati believed it would.  
Continuing to Define a Secular and Religious Democracy  
The reflexive revivalists have recently elaborated upon their conception of a combination 
of secularism and Islam within a democratic system. They suggest that secularism acts as the 
institutionalization of the fluidity of the public will through an ideologically neutral government 
apparatus. If that public will has Islam as a major marker of its identity, religion can then work 
its way into the public sphere as a representation of the governed. Other intellectuals and analysts 
that have expanded upon this combination of Islam and secularism within a democratic 
framework have produced a diverse body of opinions on the subject. As a foundational reference 
to understand how one could establish a secular and Islamic democracy, however, the work of 
Talal Asad again proves most useful. In the post-authoritarian era, Asad views secular theory as 
a combination of sensibilities and moralities, as “more than just the separation of religious and 
secular institutions in government, but [a presupposition of] new concepts of religion, ethics, and 
politics that define a new political ethic.”97 In this light, secular theory is not an unwavering 
force of religious evisceration into which all other theories and practices must assimilate, but 
rather, is an amalgamation of converging ideologies, theories, and beliefs that produce a “least 
common denominator” or an “overlapping consensus” based on common values like equality, 
human rights, or female modesty, for example. Secularism, in this way, serves to balance 
variable religious beliefs and interpretations of reality within the ever-changing expectations of 
society.98 
                                                          
97 Asad, Talal: Formations of the Secular :Christianity, Islam, Modernity. pg.16. 
 
98 Ibid. pg. 2. 
 - 53 - 
In stark opposition to the notion that religion could indeed operate within a democratic 
political system, however, ‘Ali Mirsepassi sees a religious and secular democracy as 
“contradictory and questionable at best.” He argues that: 
to have a complete democratic system, one has to desacralize all 
spheres of politics [because] all religion, in one way or another, rests 
on a concept of the sacred. If any element of government, leaders, 
ideologies, institutions, laws and the like is invested with the aura of 
the sacred, it cannot claim to have come from the will of the people. 
In a democracy, legitimacy and representation are not permanent or 
fixed. People and positions can be changed or recalled. Nothing can 
occupy a privileged position beyond the reach of popular vote.99  
 
Mirsepassi is missing the mark entirely here. Instead of understanding Islam in terms of an ever-
changing discursive tradition, that is “not permanent or fixed,” he deleteriously assumes that 
Islam cannot be representative of a collective will of individuals nor be reinterpreted and 
adjusted over time. Both assumptions are unequivocally false according to the reflexive 
revivalists. 
Soroush, for example, strongly disagrees with Mirsepassi’s desacralization prescription, 
saying first that in a religious democracy, “it is not religious per se that arbitrates, but some 
understanding of religion which is, in turn, changing, rational, and in harmony with consensual 
and accepted extra-religious criteria.”100 Religion, by this definition, is not opposed to 
democracy—which is an extra-religious social construction by nature—and therefore is 
applicable to Mirsepassi’s idea that legitimacy and representation is always changing.  Soroush 
continues saying: 
It is valid to argue that in a secular society a religious democratic 
government is impossible because religious governments are not 
answerable to the people. In such a society, the best form of 
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government would be a secular democratic regime. However, it is 
not valid to argue that nowhere and under no conditions may one 
perceive the desirability of a religious democracy, even in a 
religious society. The truth of the matter is that a religious 
government can be an appropriate reflection of a religious society. 
Indeed, in such a society a purely secular government would be 
undemocratic. 101  
 
In this light, he suggests that the extent to which a society is democratic depends directly on its 
responsiveness to the will of the people and respect for their right to individual expression. If 
religion is representative of the will of a population, ensuring a universal application of 
‘desacralization’ would itself be inimical to today’s interpretations of secular and democratic 
theory.  
Indeed, Nader Hashemi, who specializes in Islamic, democratic, and secular politics in 
Iran, agrees with Soroush that a desacralization or a complete ‘privatization of religion’ is not 
necessary for the establishment of a secular democracy. In fact, he believes that it works against 
a democratic representation of a society like Iran in which religion is a major marker of 
individual identity. He argues instead that both secularism and an interpretation of Islam that is 
operable within a democratic society would need to be socially constructed though a process of 
bottom-up reform and theoretical indigenization. They are, “earned, not assumed,” he asserts. 
Though he suggests that a secular democracy can indeed also be a religious one, he qualifies his 
argument with two “lines that cannot be crossed” within a secular democracy. These 
“minimums” for secularism come from a notion called the ‘twin tolerations.’102  
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The ‘first toleration’ is the idea that a democratic constitution cannot give religious 
organizations a ‘veto power’ over popularly elected policies. 103 This means, for example, that 
the Iranian clerical establishment could not deem a popularly approved removal of the veil in 
public as un-Islamic and counteract popular sentiment with a veto. Instead, they would be forced 
to articulate their opposition to it through democratic institution structures—the parliament or 
free press, for example. Instead of using religion coercively, they would have to use it reasonably 
by engaging the populations through ijtihad to prove their religious credentials democratically.  
The ‘second toleration’ Hashemi presents says that a secular democracy must not bar a 
religious organization from politics simply for its religious nature. 104 This means that in order 
for a religious organization to be removed from politics, it would have to be attempting to 
undermine or subvert the democratic system through violence or coercion. For the sake of 
relevance and continued public support, though, it would ostensibly be more beneficial for 
religious organizations to operate within the confines of the system.    
Like Hashemi, Eshkevari also suggests a non-coercive religious democracy that at its 
core is secular—though not in the sense Mirsepassi describes it as a desacralizaiton of the public 
space. By secular, Eshkevari means that that a religious democracy is one that is not based on the 
coercive application of religion, because religion cannot be, according to the Qur’an, imposed on 
the hearts of individuals, but must be desired by willing believers. Instead he says that a religious 
and secular democracy is: 
one that is based on the non-religious rights of the people and the 
non-political responsibility of religious individuals towards 
management and critique of power. Its first responsibility is to 
provide for the material needs of the people in order to rid them of 
such material needs, so they can attend to matters that are more 
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delicate and spiritual. The people can thus freely choose their beliefs 
and also transform society into a stage for open and free choice of 
religion.105 
 
Here, Eshkevari makes the argument that a secular society is based on the inherent human rights 
of all religious and non-religious individuals. In order for religion to be properly ‘attended to’ in 
a secular and religious democracy, he argues that a secular state must provide for the people’s 
worldly needs so that they can further incorporate spiritual matters into their daily lives. Indeed, 
this provision of worldly needs to the individual is one of the most striking counter arguments 
against the Islamic Republic, which many believe has utterly failed to produce a viable system of 
banking, international trade, and social support structures. 
Popular Hermeneutics: The Importance of Social Actors in Interpreting Tradition 
Expanding from the concept of a potential fusion between Islam and secularism in a 
democratic society, Soroush moves beyond the existing literature in his discussion of toleration. 
Indeed, Mirsepassi, Hashemi, and Asad all speak of toleration as a fundamental principle that 
inherently accompanies secular society, though the question remains as to whether or not 
toleration can be successfully reconciled within societies where there are a multiplicity of 
individual conceptions for promoting and ensuring the sanctity of ‘the Good.’106 Soroush goes 
beyond simply assuming a tolerant ethic within secular society, however. In an attempt to 
reconcile the concept of toleration within religious communities, he suggests that the idea of 
tolerance does not necessarily imply that, in accepting the self-expression of another, a tolerant 
individual is abandoning or sacrificing their own religious beliefs. Therefore, he believes, the 
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problem of intolerance depends on the choices of the individual believer, not the Islamic faith 
itself.107 
At a pragmatic and societal level, Asef Bayat and Nader Hashemi make similar claims 
that the quest to internalize new visions of Islam and secularism within the Middle East falls on 
the people themselves and particularly on their social interpretations of secular and religious 
theory. Bayat argues that little attention has been paid during the post-colonial era to what 
political theories actually meant in the day-to-day lives of people. Instead, he says that such 
theories must be defined by human history and humans themselves through social movements in 
particular, which have a decisive role in developing popular “shapings of truth.” Most 
importantly, like Soroush, he says that, “it is the social agents that determine the inclusive or 
authoritarian thrust of religions, not the religions themselves.”108  
This is a crucial point that exemplifies the shift away from notions of top-down, 
ideologically-based theories of the post-colonial era. By suggesting that individuals are the ones 
that determine how theories are expressed at a given point in history, Bayat dispels any 
preconceived notions of theories having some kind of intrinsic value outside of what a society 
allows them to have. Bayat, like Soroush, also elevates the role of human agency in the creation 
political traditions and the governmental structures through which they are corporeally 
embodied. In this light, the objectivist visions of ideological totality from post-colonial era failed 
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to successfully root themselves within the Middle East because they were not derived from the 
people themselves but were coercively imposed from the top-down, not through a bottom-up 
organic synthesis.  
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Chapter Four – Pragmatic Applications of Iran’s Islamization of Secularism within the 
Post-Authoritarian Middle East 2005 - 2014 
Chapter four discusses the pragmatic applicability of the Islamization of secularism both 
in Iran and across the Middle East. The first portion of this chapter discusses the lasting 
implications of the secular and Islamic democratic discourse in Iran after the reform movement 
was suppressed in the early 2000s. The latter two sections of this chapter deal with the 
application of the Islamization of secularism on an international scale, first by discussing the 
secularization of the leadership of Shi’ite political networks across the Middle East and second 
by offering four fundamental lessons that the Islamization of secularism can offer to other 
Middle Eastern nations currently in the process of democratic transition. 
The Islamization of Secularism after the Dismantling of the Reform Movement 2005 – 2014 
 Although the Iranian reform movement had generated a viable intellectual framework for 
Islamic, secular, and democratic governance, by 2004, it had been eclipsed by a wave of social 
and political repression under the conservative clerical establishment. In his last term as 
president from 2000 - 2004, Khatami and the Iranian reform movement were effectively 
immobilized by the subversive political efforts of Khamene’i and his control of the judiciary 
system. Iran’s reformist intellectuals, political figures, and social activists were regularly 
summoned by the court systems for even the most minimal critiques of the regime. The 
parliament and presidency were severely restricted as well, preventing them from successfully 
facilitating institutional change. By 2005, the reform movement’s role in elected positions had 
been so restricted that the Iranian people could no longer pragmatically vote for them and expect 
any change.109 
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 In addition to the regime’s domestic efforts to subvert the reform movement, 
international developments in the early 2000s overshadowed Iran’s quest for reform as well. 
After the September 11 terrorist attacks and the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, an 
‘obsession’ with the United States and its military presence in the region had overtaken the 
public discourse in Iran. Domestic fears that Iran would be the next victim of a U.S. military 
intervention grew significantly when the nation had been numbered among George W. Bush’s 
‘Axis of Evil.’ The conservative regime used this opportunity to shift the public’s attention away 
from its continuous obstruction of constitutional reform and towards the ‘Great American Satan’ 
once again. With the Iranian public fearing a United States military intervention and a blaring 
Islamophobic discourse circulating across Western and international media airwaves, the reform 
movement’s democratic efforts were utterly subsumed by a global discourse focused on Islamic 
extremism. As the 2005 presidential elections approached, the Iranian reform movement and 
their democratic ambitions had been crushed domestically by Khamene’i and overshadowed 
internationally by a violent surge of American imperialism that had a very different vision of 
democratization.110 
 By the time the 2005 presidential elections had come around, the conservative 
establishment had successfully eroded any confidence Iranians had in the reform movement’s 
ability to produce practical change. The electorate was effectively trapped between an 
immobilized reform movement and the repressive conservative establishment with few 
presidential candidates falling outside of that binary. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a former professor 
and provincial governor, had been a vocal critic of the failures of the reform movement 
throughout the early 2000s. Though he was officially running as a conservative candidate, he did 
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not appear to be completely in the back pocket of the Khamene’i’s clerical establishment. 
Instead, he appealed to some Iranians as a viable option for change outside of the reformist-
conservative gridlock. His eventual victory in the 2005 presidential elections, however, was not 
greeted with the outpouring of support that Khatami had in 1997. In fact, many Iranians had 
become so disillusioned with the political system as a whole that they didn’t even show up to 
vote.111  
 Ahmadinejad’s first term in the presidency was largely characterized by a failure to 
produce tenable economic strategies to deal with increasing unemployment as well as a 
resurgence of government restrictions on young people and women. Domestically, freedoms in 
the press were cut back significantly, professors and students at universities that had remained 
sympathetic to reform movement ideology were forced out, and the reformist majority in the 
majlis had all but evaporated. Internationally, Ahmadinejad had reversed what meager gains 
Khatami had made in easing Iran’s international isolation by giving the nation a friendlier voice 
in the global arena. In part a ploy to take advantage of Iran’s increasing regional influence as a 
result of the toppled Afghani and Iraqi governments, Ahmadinejad also sought to increase his 
domestic and international popularity by stoking national and regional sentiments against Israel 
and the West. He denied the Holocaust, condemned the United States’ military interventions, and 
suggested that if it were up to the populations of the Middle East, Israel would be voted out of 
existence. In 2006, when Iran refused to allow UN inspections of its nuclear facilities, the West 
assumed the worst due in part to Ahmadinejad’s vitriolic international grandstanding and ramped 
up the sanctions that the U.S. had in place for years.112 
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 In addition to further corrupting Iran’s international image and launching rampant 
domestic crackdowns, another defining characteristic of Ahmadinejad’s first term in office was 
the increasing economic hardship from Western sanctions that were imposed after the 2006 
expulsion of UN nuclear inspectors. By the end of Ahmadinejad’s first term in 2009, Iran’s 
unemployment rate was on the rise again despite marginal improvement since 2005, international 
and domestic business opportunities were stifled by sanctions, and Iran’s essential oil exports 
had fallen from 2.5 million barrels per day to approximately 1 million barrels per day.113 Iranians 
were promised change and had instead been confronted with the possibility of a U.S. invasion, 
harsher economic sanctions, and a new surge of government violations of their individual 
freedoms.  
 In 2009, with all political avenues for change looking increasingly bleak, the reformists 
had another opportunity to retake Iran’s presidency. Mir Hussein Mousavi, the pragmatist prime 
minister who served during the Iran-Iraq War, emerged as the reformist frontrunner for the 
presidency. Despite the reformists’ failure to deliver meaningful political change in the early 
2000s, the discourse of reform and the Iranian intellectuals’ plans for Islamic democracy still 
resonated with nearly two thirds of the population. The reformists no longer promised any 
fundamental or revolutionary change, however, but instead focused the Mousavi campaign on 
steering Iran away from the destructive domestic and international policies that Ahmadinejad had 
pursued. Indeed, the reformists’ campaign had managed to succeed in mobilizing Iran’s 
electorate with a nearly 85 percent turnout at the elections.114  
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 After voting had concluded, the conservative regime suspiciously shut down the reformist 
campaign’s election monitoring system, which allowed them to keep track of vote tallies in real 
time and report fraud if they saw it. Shortly thereafter, Mousavi’s campaign website also went 
out of service. After only a day of counting votes, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was hastily 
pronounced the victor despite the fact that there was a legally mandated three day waiting period 
before the announcement could be made.115 The reformists were in utter disbelief that 
Ahmadinejad could have won and began to find many discrepancies with this outcome. For 
example:  
Mousavi received fewer votes in his hometown of Tabriz than 
Ahmadinejad; Karoubi’s [the second of three reformist candidates] 
total vote was less than the number of people active in his campaign, 
and Rezaee’s [the third reformist candidate] votes shrank by a 
hundred thousand in the final stages of the announcement. 
 
In addition to this, after all of the votes were tallied, Ahmadinejad had apparently received more 
total votes in this election with nearly 85 percent voter turnout than he did in the 2005 election 
with only 60 percent voter turnout. Many Iranians believed this to be inconceivable in light of his 
extremely unpopular domestic and foreign policies and well-established political knowledge that 
high voter turnout rarely favors the incumbent. 116 
 After scrutinizing the election process in search of more discrepancies, all evidence 
suggested that there had been no falsely added votes and that the election had indeed been 
conducted properly. The fraud, the reformists discovered, was not in how the election was 
conducted as they had expected, but in the official announcement of the results. When the vote 
count was received by the Ministry of the Interior, it was hastily readjusted and Mahmoud 
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Ahmadinejad, shocked by the results himself, was fraudulently handed a second term as Iran’s 
president.117 Shortly after the election results were officially announced in June 2009, dismayed 
voters poured out onto the streets, donning green arm and headbands that they had used during 
the campaign to show support for Mousavi. They carried signs that read, ‘where is my vote?’ 
(rā’ī man kujast?), and over the following weeks, nearly one million Iranians had mobilized, 
demanding accountability for what they believed was a blatantly rigged election. These were by 
far the largest protests Iran had seen since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 and the 
conservative regime was well aware of its potential consequences. 
  These mass mobilization came to be known as the Iranian Green Movement (junbish-e 
sabz-e irān) and was a diverse combination of Iranians from various economic and social 
backgrounds, united in their demands for democratic accountability. These largely peaceful 
demonstrations, however, were met with excessive government brutality. The revolutionary 
guard, basij militias, and state police forces attacked the Iranian people on the streets in an 
attempt to halt the protests. They indiscriminately beat and imprisoned people and occasionally 
resorted to shooting protestors from rooftops with high-powered sniper rifles to disperse the 
crowds. Government violence did not stop the protests, however. Social media and camera 
phones played a major role in disseminating images of government brutality, sparking more 
popular outrage and causing the movement to grow. By the end of 2009, the Green Movement 
had reached more than three million strong and their initial focus on the sham election had 
shifted to calls for the downfall of the Khamene’i regime and a transition to democracy.118   
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   By the spring of 2010, however, the security forces’ excessive presence in the streets, 
complete shutdowns of reformist media and communication sources, and a systematic campaign 
to incarcerate prominent political figures within the Green Movement’s upper echelons had 
proved successful. Mir Hussein Mousavi was placed under house arrest in February and was 
effectively cut off from any form of communication with his supporters or the outside world. 
Ahmadinejad, Khamene’i, and the Revolutionary Guard had solidified their control of the 
Islamic Republic and initiated a period of unprecedented dictatorial repression not seen since the 
Shah era. The Green Movement had effectively died out in the streets, but its lasting significance 
cannot be understated. The protests in 2009 exposed the cracks within the conservative 
establishment, officially dispelled the illusory notion that the Islamic Republic was a legitimate 
‘religious democracy’ for all the world to see, and forced the Revolutionary Guard to emerge 
from the shadows as a major power player in Iran.119 
Though the Green Movement was initially an outburst of anger for the violation of Iran’s 
thirty year tradition of fairly administered elections, at a much deeper level, it was the corporeal 
manifestation of the democratic hope that the reform movement’s intellectual discourse of 
Islamic secular democracy had generated among Iran’s populations. More precisely, it 
meaningfully demonstrated that the reformist intellectual narrative was still very much alive in 
the Iranian public discourse despite the outward appearance of the repressive conservative 
regime and the reform movement’s failure to change the state’s institutional structures.  Over the 
next four years of Ahmadinejad’s second term in office, however, that residual hope would be 
severely put to the test.  
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Between 2010 and 2013, Iran’s domestic situation became extraordinarily bleak. 
Absolute dictatorial repression gripped the country as the conservative establishment cracked 
down on any semblance of opposition. As the Arab uprisings erupted across the Middle East 
beginning in 2011, Khamene’i and his conservative regime further entrenched their absolute 
authority, executing, imprisoning, and torturing any remaining individuals still explicitly 
sympathetic to Green Movement. The Islamic Republic’s belligerent mouthpiece, President 
Ahmadinejad, had also become increasingly unmanageable for Khamene’i, both internationally 
and domestically. By the end of his presidency, a deep rift between the conservative clerical 
authorities and Ahmadinejad had opened up, causing Khamene’i to restrict the Iranian 
presidency’s power to little more than an international spokesman. Western sanctions had also 
ramped up significantly against the Islamic Republic for its persistent nuclear program, and by 
the beginning of 2013, the value of Iran’s currency had fallen by nearly 80 percent, oil exports 
were at an all-time low, and unemployment had shot up to 14 percent.120  
As Iran’s 2013 presidential elections approached, Khamene’i knew that his regime would 
be faced with dire consequences and another mass uprising if he falsified the election results 
again. Domestic calls for a general boycott of the election circulated with rumors that Iran’s 
Guardian Council—which is responsible for approving presidential candidates—would not allow 
any non-conservative candidates to run. That notion, however, was partially proven wrong as 
reform-oriented candidates that ran as self-described ‘moderates’ were allowed through the 
selection process. One among them was Hassan Rouhani, a former nuclear negotiator, member 
of Iran’s Assembly of Experts, and mid-ranking cleric. Rouhani’s campaign focused on changing 
the direction of Iran’s international isolation by re-engaging the West and easing nuclear 
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tensions. He also promised to decrease domestic restrictions on the freedom of speech and the 
press, vowing to cut back security force oversight in universities and civil society. Though the 
power of the presidency had been severely restricted during Ahmadinejad’s last term in office 
and such lofty campaign goals depended largely on the willingness of Khamene’i’s regime to 
allow them to happen, Rouhani’s campaign proved successful, winning him just over 50 percent 
of the overall vote, with his closest opponent receiving only 17 percent.121  
It had been widely assumed, given the extreme political repression and consolidation of 
power after the Green Movement protests, that Khamene’i would dictate the outcome of the 
election. The fact that he not only failed to unite all the conservatives behind a single candidate 
and that the overwhelming majority of Iranians united behind Rouhani’s calls for ‘moderation’ 
spoke volumes about the lasting effects of the Iranian Green Movement and its undergirding 
discourse of Islamic and secular democratic reform. Though Rouhani’s power to meaningfully 
direct policy in the Islamic Republic is severely limited today, his recent efforts to ease Western 
sanctions, soften Iran’s harsh international image, and curb Iran’s nuclear program stand as 
testaments to Khamene’i's lack of absolute authority. There are deepening cracks within the 
conservative ranks, many clerics are speaking out in opposition to the regime and its violence in 
the name of Islam, and an unequivocal victory of a subterranean discourse of secular and Islamic 
reform has swept the hearts and minds of nearly 80 percent of the Iranian public. 122  Achieving 
lasting democratic change within the central hub of politicized Shi’ite clerical authority, 
however, will be a matter of time and patience.  
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Situating Iran’s Intellectuals within an International Shi’ite Political Discourse 
In an interview in 2010, ‘Abolkarim Soroush appropriately described the concept of 
Islamic secularism that was becoming increasingly popular throughout the 1990s within the 
ranks of transnational Shi’ite political organizations. “A line has been drawn,” he said: 
between religion and power. This delineation means that, in keeping 
with their religious duties, religious people can take part in power 
and politics … [however,] they cannot claim exclusive rights in the 
name of religion or claim that religion has only one single 
interpretation, which is the official [clerical] one. These are all 
things that nowadays fall under the banner of political secularism.123 
 
Soroush’s vision of secular politics, whereby religious individuals in power and political roles 
could still be fully devout Muslims without asserting a claim to Islamic esotericism or imposing 
religious truth on others, rang true with the earlier efforts of his fellow Iranian intellectuals. 
Though this discourse of Islamic secularism has failed thus far to produce significant 
institutional changes within the Iranian state itself, perhaps some of most profound effects can be 
seen within the recently secularized leadership of Shi’ite political organizations throughout the 
Middle East. Just as Iran’s intellectuals were heavily influenced by the outcomes of the Iranian 
Revolution, so too did its consequences weigh heavily on the many Shi’ite political organizations 
abroad. It is useful, therefore, to begin by looking at a regional disappointment with the Iranian 
Revolution to understand how a discourse of Islamic secularism could meaningfully replace it. 
In 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini had declared the Islamic Revolution to be a ‘victory for all 
of Muslims.’ The Iranian Revolution’s success in casting out the imperialist West was indeed 
representative of a supposed universal victory for an Islamic ideology that fell well outside of the 
Cold War’s universalistic binaries. Its ideological triumphalism had generated a great deal of 
expectations and hope for Islamic organizations abroad, who were similarly experiencing the 
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effects of imperialist duress. By the beginning of the 1990s, however, a separation of many 
Shi’ite organizations from clerical power centers in Iran and Iraq had become increasingly 
evident. Lay and clerical leaders of these organizations in Iraq, the Levant, and the Gulf felt as 
though the Islamic Republic had established a monopoly on Shi’ite religious power and had 
relegated them and their interests to the periphery. Their discontent grew as they perceived that 
Khomeini and the new Iranian epicenter of clerical political power were myopically focused on 
forcefully exporting the revolution to Iraq and eliminating factional opposition within Iran’s 
domestic political structures. Just as the revolution’s initial triumph had reverberated across the 
region in 1979, so did many of its unfulfilled expectations.124 
The failure of the Islamic Revolution throughout the 1980s and 90s to pragmatically 
deliver on its ideological promises resulted in a widespread trend of, “domestification of Shi’ite 
political concerns.”125 This shift inwards exacerbated an existing rift between lay officials and 
the clergy within these peripheral Shi’ite political groups as well. These lay political figures, 
known as iffindīs in the Gulf and Iraq, traced their intellectual heritage back to ‘Ali Shari’ati and 
his biting disavowal of the clerical establishment. The extent to which the new Iranian 
intellectuals’ notion of Islamic secularism had influenced international Shi’ite political networks 
became clear not only due to a pronounced shift away from clerical power centers in Iran, but 
also through a blatant transition to iffindi leadership in the 1990s. This idea of Islamic secularism 
had gained significant traction within these international Shi’ite political networks as a pragmatic 
solution to existing frustrations with Iranian clerical hegemony. Instead of relying on Iran’s 
clerical power centers, which had offered many of these Shi’ite groups little more than a 
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supposed perfection of Islamic ideology, they turned to the iffindis and embraced the pragmatism 
of Islamic secularism to address their local issues.126 
In Iraq, for example, the Shi’ite political party al-da’wa al-islamiyya (the Islamic 
Calling), which was founded by the late Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, severed ties 
with the clerical establishment in the 1980s. After Saddam’s execution of Baqir al-Sadr and other 
members of al-da’wa in 1980 for their support of the Iranian revolution, a power struggle 
between the group’s clerical and lay leadership ensued. Al-da’wa’s new leadership turned away 
from Iran and Baqir al-Sadr’s vision for the group to establish a universal Shi’ite guardianship 
over the entire world of believers (velāyat-olumma), focusing instead on alleviating persistent 
domestic persecution and government purges during the Iran-Iraq War. The clerics within the 
party’s ranks that had previously occupied leadership roles gradually withdrew from politics 
throughout the 1990s, and today, lay officials have completely replaced them.127   
In Bahrain, political influence within Shi’ite religious groups has similarly shifted from 
clerics to lay officials. For example, the al-Wifaq Shi’ite political party decided that it would 
participate in the 2006 parliamentary elections despite an existing boycott that had been in place 
as a result of the Bahraini monarchy’s decision to suspend the nation’s constitution. ‘Ali Salman, 
the party’s lay figurehead, had managed to muster enough political support outside of religious 
circles to proceed with the decision to take part in the elections. Only after gaining that domestic 
support did he go through a prolonged process of reaching out to Ayatollah ‘Ali Sistani—one of 
the highest ranking marja’iyyat (plural for marja’)—to receive his official religious approval. 
                                                          
126  Ibid. pg. 24-5. 
 
127 Ibid. pg. 126. and Louer, Lawrence. Transnational Shia Politics Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf. pg. 
84-7. 
 
 - 71 - 
Weeks after the decision had already been made within the party ranks, Ayatollah Sistani issued 
his consent for their participation in the elections. This delayed response and the fact that 
Sistani’s approval was only sought out after the decision had already been made speaks volumes 
about the significantly diminished role of clerical officials in political decision making.128     
Ayatollah ‘Ali Sistani’s approval of al-Wifaq’s participation in the Bahraini elections is 
also representative of another increasing trend of indirect rather than direct clerical intervention 
into politics. Sistani like many other high-ranking clerics within the Shi’ite establishment have 
either never been active in politics or have withdrawn to fulfilling indirect roles outside of Iran’s 
governing circles. Ayatollah Sadiq Husseini Shirazi, for example, a high-ranking Ayatollah from 
Karbala, Iraq, decided to remove himself from politics completely, surrendering political 
decision making to his ‘local representatives,’ saying that they were ‘better informed’ than he 
was in relation to actual political situations and that his area of expertise remained only in the 
study of Islam.129 These apolitical and indirectly involved clerics have been deemed ‘quietists,’ 
though their opposition to clerical governance—specifically that of Ayatollah Khamene’i—has 
become more vocal over recent years as a result of what they perceive to be an exploitation of 
Islam to maintain political control. 
Even more pronounced than clerics removing themselves from positions of political 
authority, however, is a movement of clerics who have been educated within the howzehs 
(theological seminaries) turning away from the profession altogether. In Saudi Arabia, for 
example, a former cleric by the name of Mohammed al-Mahfouz said, “Islam can do without the 
‘ulema and may be regarded as a personal matter, between God and the individual believer, as 
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Sunnis believe.”130 Though this idea of removing the necessity of the clerics in Shi’a Islam is not 
new, it has regained significant traction after intellectuals like Soroush, Shabestari, and 
Eshkevari had reignited an anti-clerical theoretical discourse in the 1990s that Shari’ati had 
proposed prior to the Islamic Revolution.  
Evidence of this shift away from clerical authority within international Shi’ite political 
organizations is perhaps the greatest success story thus far of the Iranian intellectuals’ 
Islamization of secularism. Rather than clerical figures leading political organizations and using 
‘official’ religious authority to dictate the path the group should take, lay religious individuals 
have resoundingly taken up leadership roles in their stead. Religion in this regard is still very 
much a part of these groups’ political orientations, though the secularized leadership and their 
opinions regarding Islam remain fundamentally that—opinions. Iran’s intellectual Islamization 
of secularism, however, has a far broader applicability than simply inspiring Islamic 
secularization at the political party level. At the theory’s core, the reflexive revivalists sought to 
create a secular and Islamic democracy, an idea that has profound implications for a Middle East 
in the midst of democratic upheaval.  
Defining a Post-Authoritarian Discourse: Four Lessons for Emerging Middle Eastern 
Democracies from the Iranian Islamization of Secularism 
The democratic aspect of Iran’s Islamization of secularism is perhaps the discourse’s 
most important defining characteristic. Without democracy and its capacity to institutionalize the 
fluidity of popular sentiments and interpretations of religion, even the Islamic secularism that is 
sweeping the ranks of Shi’ite political parties across the region has the capacity to become 
repressive and authoritarian. In order to better understand the fundamental democratic message 
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of the reflexive revivalists’ Islamization of secularism, it is useful to first look at how another 
scholar has described their revolutionary efforts to establish a new Islamic political discourse. 
Asef Bayat, an Iranian-American author and cultural critic, who specializes in social 
movements and their relationship to political and Islamic theory, has usefully summarized the 
intellectual efforts of Iran’s reflexive revivalists. He characterizes them according to the 
following four principles:  
(1) They embrace modernity by not only following in a long 
tradition of accepting science and reason’s compatibility with Islam, 
but also creating new ideas and new discursive vocabularies to 
accompany them (2) they are post-nationalist in nature in that they 
stopped blaming the outside world for their problems, but instead 
sought a different notion of freedom than their revolutionary 
predecessors – they sought freedom as liberty not freedom as 
liberation from the outside world (3) they are post-revolutionary in 
that they abandoned the notions that the clerical regime maintained 
of martyrdom, bravery, and militancy, and instead advocated for 
tolerance, peaceful coexistence, and democratic reform. (4) They 
are post-ideological in that they stood against the idea that religion 
should or could be ideologized, which meant that it necessarily was 
the antithesis of free critical thinking, needed to ‘create enemies’ 
and inherently fostered authoritarian-style domination, which 
encouraged apostasy and ‘Secularism’ [understood in an anti-
religious ideological sense].131  
 
Based on this relatively comprehensive description, Bayat suggests that Iran’s intellectuals have 
inaugurated a discourse that is ‘post-nationalist,’ ‘post-revolutionary,’ ‘post-ideological,’ and 
finally, he builds up to the all-inclusive description, ‘post-Islamist.’132  
 It is critical to understand what Bayat specifically means by saying that these individuals 
have created a post-Islamist discourse, because it is not sufficient to simply describe this new 
intellectual era in terms of what it is not. Indeed, it is not ‘Islamist’ meaning that it does not 
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adhere to some ideological or static vision of Islamic theory. It is, however, according to Bayat, 
“both a condition and a project, which must be embodied within a master (or multidimensional) 
movement.” The first phase of this movement he says was a popular experimentation with and 
ultimate exhaustion of Islamic ideology due to its failures to produce pragmatic results in the 
economic and political world. At this point, he says that the movement was forced to reinvent 
itself, but “[did] so at the cost of a qualitative shift away from its fundamental ideological 
principles.”133   
 The second phase of this ‘post-Islamist’ movement Bayat says was a, “conscious attempt 
to conceptualize and strategize the rationale and modalities of transcending Islamism.” Through 
this description, he suggests that the reflexive revivalists’ intellectual efforts are best understood 
as a transcendence of Islamism. He subsequently qualifies this notion of ‘transcendence,’ 
however, saying that it, “[was] neither anti-Islamic, nor un-Islamic, nor secular, [but] turned the 
underlying principles of Islamism on its head … by emphasizing rights instead of duties, 
plurality in place of a singular authoritative voice, … and the future instead of the past.”134  
Alternatively, it is crucial to view any recent evolution in the interpretation of Islam in 
terms of a discursive tradition. In this light, the reflexive revivalists were not necessarily 
opposing ideological Islam or what Bayat thinks were its ‘fundamental principles’ that opposed 
‘rights, plurality, and the future.’ Rather, they reformed fundamental aspects of past Islamic 
theory to produce a superior representation of what Islamic truth meant to them in the present in 
reference to a past body of textual and experiential knowledge. It is important to remember as 
well that the Islamic ideology that the Iranian regime draws its legitimacy from today was at one 
                                                          
133 Bayat, Asef. Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn. pg. 10-11. 
 
134 Ibid. pg. 11. 
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point in time what the majority of Iranians believed to be the greatest expression of Islamic 
Truth. As such, the problem with Iranian ‘Islamism’ was not specifically that it was ‘opposed to 
rights, plurality, or the future’—all of which Iranians had assumed ideological Islam would 
attend to in 1979—but rather that it had been warped during the Iran-Iraq War into an 
unmalleable authoritarian government. Therefore, to classify the Islamization of secularism as, 
“post-Islamist” is both misleading and inaccurate. Rather, it was its revolutionary 
reconceptualization of secular democracy that best defined it, and more specifically, how 
politicized Islam as an evolving discursive tradition fundamentally requires a democratic secular 
neutrality to ensure the continuous production of Islamic reason and knowledge.   
Unlike during the post-colonial political era, Iran’s reflexive revivalists were no longer 
operating within a discourse of absolutes or oppositionalism. They were not fixated on casting 
out the West, casting out Islamic ideology, and certainly not on defining their democratic theory 
in terms of what it was not, as Bayat has with his myriad of ‘post-’ distinctions. Instead, they 
pragmatically embraced their history and built their interpretations of the present on top of a 
body of experiential social, political, and religious knowledge. Today, the final step for the 
Islamization of secularism is to see its immense potential realized within an actual democratic 
system. For the time being, the Iranian people will have to wait for more opportune 
circumstances to transition to democracy. Many Arab nations across the Middle East, however, 
are presently in the process of democratic transition and Iran’s intellectual Islamization of 
secularism can offer crucial inspiration for these nations as they will invariably need to confront 
today’s evolving relationship between Islam, secularism, and democracy. 
It is imperative to emphasize that the Iranian reflexive revivalists’ ideas must not be 
blindly emulated by other Middle Eastern democratization efforts. Rather, it is best to understand 
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the international applicability of the Islamization of secularism in terms of a divisible set of the 
following four principles. First, universalism, theoretical objectivity, and ideological discourses 
speaking in absolutes are unsustainable bases for democratic politics. They do not allow for 
democracy to properly function because they are inherently averse to change and may be utilized 
to force varying conceptions of reality on individuals that may not see it in the same way. 
Second, Islam is best understood as lending a non-coercive spiritual and moral dimension 
to political, economic, and social interactions of individuals if it is to be applied within imperfect 
human political constructions. While Islam as a religion itself is infallible and perfect, political 
derivations of it and human religious knowledge as a whole is fallible and must be subject to 
change. Third, Secularism is best understood as a fundamental governmental neutrality with 
regards to ideology that allows for agency to rest in the hands of the governed. It is also the 
fundamental necessity of a democratic society as it fosters a degree of political tolerance among 
both religious and non-religious individuals. This political tolerance can then prevent the erosion 
of democracy through ideological coercion and allows democratic elections to determine which 
interpretation of religious or non-religious policy is the most applicable in that present moment.  
Finally, the role for independent human reasoning (ijtihad) to interpret both Islamic texts 
and religious knowledge and translate them into political systems is central to the combination of 
Islam and secular democracy. Because there is no reference to a specific style of governance in 
the infallible sources of Islamic truth (the Qur’an and Sunna), an additional level of ijtihad that 
focuses on both non-religious and religious knowledge is necessary to establish the most 
preferred interpretation of political theory as it changes over time. This results of this ijthiad, 
however, must remain fluid and their interpretations continuous in accordance with the Islamic 
discursive tradition if they are to be applied within a democratic framework.     
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion: Obstacles to a Democratic Iran and Limits of this Research 
 
By framing the Iranian reform movement’s Islamization of secularism historically, 
theoretically, and through its pragmatic applications since its inception in the 1990s, a concept of 
what secular and Islamic governance could look like in a post-authoritarian Middle East has been 
articulated. A new conceptualization of secular theory is best understood in terms of two central 
ideas. First, as Talal Asad suggests, generally speaking, ‘the secular’ is essentially the creation of 
a unique set of overlapping consensuses within a domestic context. That overlapping consensus 
can range anywhere from a consensual privatization of religion and a descralization of the public 
sphere to a fully religious government. The identity of secularism fundamentally relies, 
therefore, on the way that it is indigenized within society and what they decide their ‘overlapping 
consensus’ should be. Second, secularism, as it has been indigenized in Iran, is a fundamental 
ideological neutrality of the state that allows for political agency to rest in the hands of the 
governed. In this way, the secular and democratic government system is malleable and can be 
shaped based on the public will as it invariably changes over time.  
With this notion of secularism in mind, politicized Islam is best integrated within a 
secular framework when it adheres to three recent reconceptualizations of Islamic truth. First, 
according to Talal Asad, Islam should be broadly understood in terms of a discursive tradition. 
This discursive tradition is essentially an evolving ‘framework of inquiry’ through which 
Muslims interpret their present circumstances based on a compilation of experiential religious 
knowledge and textual references extended through time. This suggests that interpretive 
knowledge of Islam is in constant flux and is necessarily affected by both religious and non-
religious influences at different points in history. Second, according to ‘Abodlkarim Soroush, 
Islam as a political force is a fundamentally human and, therefore, fallible construction. As such, 
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there can be no esoteric claims by clerics or individuals to a single conception of Islamic political 
truth. In this light, two levels of ijtihad are necessary today in order to effectively check and 
balance interpretations of Islamic truth. The first is a traditional narrative-based ijtihad that 
focuses on interpreting the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet. The second is an innovative 
reason-based ijtihad that focuses on the results of narrative-based ijtihad as well as non-religious 
sources of human knowledge in order to effectively establish popular consensus among various 
interpretations of Islam and their relation to the world. Finally, according to Hassan Yousefi 
Eshkevari, Islam is fundamentally a spiritual matter of the individual believer and cannot be 
forced on the heart of the unwilling. This notion of coincides with the Qur’anic mandate that 
says, “there is to be no compulsion in the acceptance of religion. The right course has been made 
clear from the wrong. So whoever disbelieves in idolatry and believes in Allah has grasped the 
most trustworthy handhold with no break in it…”135 This suggests that the acceptance of religion 
is truly an individual matter and that Islamic truth can speak for itself and therefore does not 
require coercion to be rightfully heard. 
With these reconceptualizations from the Islamization of secularism in mind, the 
politicization of Islam fundamentally relies on a non-coercive secular framework in order to 
institutionalize the perpetual change inherent to the Islamic discursive tradition. Through this 
discursive tradition, Muslims continuously interpret the world with both reason and narrative-
based ijtihad through a framework of experiential religious knowledge extended through time. 
They can then apply their conclusions within a democratic framework, by placing their findings 
in front of the masses to be judged as Ali Akbar Hakimizadeh had urged more than 80 years ago. 
                                                          
135 al-Qur'an al-Karim. Translated by Sahih International. (Sura 2, Verse 256). 
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Through this unique democratic theory, the Iranian reflexive revivalists issued a 
threatening challenge to the authoritarian clerical government within Iran. Though they have 
been marginalized for the last two decades, their theory is very much alive both within Iran itself 
as well as abroad. The prospects for democratic transition in Iran today are actually quite good 
despite the government’s continuous violation of individual freedoms. For example, many of 
Iran’s young men and women have been through university systems both within Iran and abroad, 
providing Iranian civil society with a body of well-informed and cosmopolitan social agents with 
high expectations of government; young Iranians have overwhelmingly turned away from 
clerical authority and discounted a revolutionary narrative of international isolation, martyrdom, 
and dutiful piety; the clerical conservative regime is almost completely isolated internationally 
with few allies capable of assisting them should a mass uprising occur; many high-ranking 
clerics have turned away from the Iranian regime and have sharply criticized Ayatollah 
Khamene’i for using Islam as a means of political repression; and most importantly, nearly 80 
percent of the population supports the democratic reform narrative that was undergirded by the 
intellectual efforts of Iran’s reflexive revivalists.136 
Despite all of these trends suggesting that a realization of the Islamization of secularism 
in Iran is possible, there are four major obstacles that have hindered democratic transition. First, 
the Iranian regime is not simply an authoritarian government, but is a religious government that 
still maintains the unwavering support of about 20 percent of the population. According to a 
former member of the Iranian Green Movement, “these people still really believe that the rahbar 
is the representative of God on earth. They would die for him if he told them God wanted them 
to.”137 Second, in addition to this zealous portion of the population—many of whom are already 
                                                          
136 Hashemi, Nader. “Is Rouhanin the Iranian Gorbachev?” and Milani, Abbas. “Prospects for Democracy in Iran” 
 
 - 80 - 
members of the armed forces, basij militias, or the police force—the Pasdaran (Revolutionary 
Guard), has a vested interest in keeping the conservative government in power, violently if 
necessary. During the reconstruction era in the early 1990s, Khamene’i and Rafsanjani gave the 
Pasdaran control of approximately 40 percent of the entire Iranian economy. Should the current 
political balance be upset, their economic interests would likely be threatened by a new 
government system. As such, there is a good reason to believe that, as demonstrated during the 
Green Movement protests of 2009, the armed forces would willingly fire upon the population if 
there was a democratic uprising.138 
Third, with the knowledge that the armed forces would likely fire upon the Iranian people 
if their economic and political interests were threatened, the specter of the Syrian civil war looms 
over the head of many Iranians. With well over one hundred thousand people dead and the civil 
war showing no signs of slowing down, the Iranian people, in many ways, fear a similar bloody 
fate. In addition to that, the violent anarchy and mass political executions that ensued after the 
1978-79 Islamic Revolution are still very much alive in many Iranians’ memory. Finally, the 
international sanctions that are in place have overwhelmingly hurt the Iranian people more than 
the conservative establishment. With their currency devalued by nearly 80 percent since 2006, 
economic hardship has afflicted lower and middle-class Iranians alike. As such, many do not 
have the luxury to step away from their occupations for long periods of time, making a 
prolonged popular insurrection less of a reality for many Iranians who need to focus instead on 
managing everyday expenses.139 
                                                          
137 Anonymous. Interview conducted February 16, 2014. When I told this individual that my work may be publically 
published on the university’s website, they asked that I kept their identity confidential.  
 
138 Hashemi, Nader. “Is Rouhanin the Iranian Gorbachev?” and Milani, Abbas. “Prospects for Democracy in Iran” 
 
139 Ibid. 
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Democratic transition in Iran will likely come via a prolonged reform effort rather than a 
popular uprising. For the time being, however, the revolutionary intellectual efforts of the 
reflexive revivalists, need not be confined to Iran. Their discourse of democratic reform and a 
combination of non-coercive secular and Islamic theory can indeed have profound implications 
as a viable reference for other nations across the Middle East in their own democratic transitions. 
The reflexive revivalists must not be blindly mimicked nor disregarded, but religious 
intellectuals within nascent Middle Eastern democracies must indigenize their own conceptions 
of secular and Islamic theory, using Iran’s Islamization of secularism as a useful framework of 
reference not a model for reproduction.   
 Democratic transition will remain an immense task for intellectuals across the Middle 
East and one that will certainly warrant future research as the Islamization of secularism 
continues to evolve as it is adapted within various national contexts. The greatest limitations of 
this particular research study, however, were twofold. First, the vast majority of the intellectual 
publications of these thinkers remain untranslated from Persian and are notoriously difficult to 
obtain. Few libraries have access to any of these Persian volumes, meaning that I unfortunately 
had to rely mostly on secondary sources to gather the majority of the quotes from the theorists 
used in this case study. Second, there is very little that has been written on this topic, with most 
intellectual histories of contemporary Iran ending with the initial works of Soroush, without 
juxtaposing his ideas with those of the many other theorists who have elaborated on his 
intellectual efforts.   
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